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NOTES
FEDERAL VENUE REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN CORPORATIONS*
THE gradual extension of the jurisdiction of federal courts over foreign
corporations has been a process of adjusting outmoded juristic stereotypes
to the pragmatic need of exposing these business units to suit.' The original
rule in diversity of citizenship cases, that a corporation could sue or be sued
only when all of its stockholders were citizens of the state of incorporation,2
raised almost insuperable barriers to federal jurisdiction. A further obstacle
was Chief Justice Taney's precedential dogma of the non-existence of a cor-
poration outside the state of its creation,3 which, if logically applied, would
have precluded personal judgments against the corporation in other states.
4
In view of the vast amount of business transacted outside the state of in-
corporation, such immunity from suit was patently infeasible. Consequently,
the federal courts took cognizance of suits involving foreign corporations,
resorting to a series of fictions that subordinated logic and even fact to neces-
sity. More than half a century after the enactment of the first Judiciary Act,6
the Supreme Court finally held that, for purposes of jurisdiction in diversity
of citizenship cases, a corporation was conclusively presumed to be composed
only of citizens of the state of its incorporation. 6 In order to establish personal
jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the states where they were doing
business, several theories designed to secure effective service of process-
"consent," "presence," "submission," "reasonable regulation" - have been
employed.7 But a court possessing the requisite jurisdiction over subject
* Neirbo Co. et aL. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 153 (U. S.
1939).
1. An excellent general discussion of the background and development of judicial
treatment of foreign corporations is found in HENDERSON, TE POSITION OF FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS IN AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918).
2. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch. 61 (U. S. 1809). In 1840, the
Supreme Court held that in diversity suits involving corporations, all the incorporators
must be citizens of states different from that of the opposing litigant. Commercial &
Railroad Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60 (U. S. 1840).
3. "It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boun-
daries of the sovereignty by which it is created . . . It must dwell in the place of its
creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty." Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet.
519, 588 (U. S. 1839).
4. See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 355 (1882) ; BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
AND TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (1904) 125.
5. 1 STAT. 73 (1789).
6. Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853). Cf. Louisville R. R. v.
Letson, 2 How. 497 (U. S. 1844) (earlier presumption that a corporation is a "citizen"
of the state of creation). This fiction was strained to the limit in Doctor v. Harrington,
196 U. S. 579 (1905), where New Jersey stockholders of a New York corporation were
allowed to sue the corporation on diversity grounds.
7. The fictions developed to extend the jurisdiction of federal courts over foreign
corporations are the same as those used for the state courts. For extensive discussion of
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matter and persons is not necessarily the proper forum for the action. Since
venue must also be satisfied, a defendant may demand that the action be
brought in the appropriate district. By taking advantage of this venue privi-
lege, a foreign corporation, until recently, could often take refuge from the
federal courts.8
The federal venue statute of 1875 provided that, in all federal actions, a
defendant could be sued only in a district "whereof he is an inhabitant or
whcre he shall be found!"9 Under this act, the Supreme Court held in E.
parte Schollenberger'° that a foreign corporation which appointed an a-(nt
for service of process according to the law of the state in which it was doing
business was suable in the federal courts of that state. The accepted ration.ade
of this case was that, by appointing an agent, the corporation consented to
be "found," thereby waiving its venue privilege.11 But in 1F87 the statute
was changed so as to eliminate the "found" clause. It was provided that an
action should be brought only in the district whereof the defenlant was an
inhabitant, except that actions based solely on diversity of citizenship Ahwl.'l
be brought "only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the
defendant."12
It was soon established, for purposes of venue, that a corporation wa-q a
resident or inhabitant only of the state in which it was incorporatcd.13 In
the various theories, see HENFrsox, op. cit. satra note 1, at 77-100; Beale, TI:e Con lit
of Laws. rS86-i896 (1937) 50 HAr.v. L. Rn'. 87, 893; Dullingto.i, JA.risditiou: O'cr
Forcign Corporations (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 147; Cahill, Jrisilion Over Forc n
Corporations and Indiz'd'!als W1'hzo Carry cn Bv'sinss Within the Terriiory (1917) 30
Liry. L. Rnv. 676; Fead, Jurisdiction; over Foreign ¢orporafios (1926) 24 Mcn. L.
REv. 633; Scott, Jrisdiction ocver Non-Residents Doing B",s~T,css Witt;in the State (1919)
32 HA1n. L. REv. 871. Some of the problems peculiar to federal c urt are diccu:tcd in
Comment, Federal Jurisdiction Over Forcign Corporations (1935) 35 C . - Rr'. 591.
S. Venue, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is not a matter oii the curt'*; IJw.er
to deal with controversies but simply relates to the geographical place of trial, It is a
personal privilege of the defendant and can be waived either e,%pressly or imfolilly. Gen-
eral Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U. S. 261 (1922); Lee v. Cie~ip al:e & 0. Ry.,
260 U. S. 653 (1922) ; see Dobie, I'enue in Civil Cases in the Unitd States Dis.r n,
Court (1925) 35 YALE L. 3. 129; Foster, Place of Tria! in Ch-1l .lctio'ns tl930) 43
HAzv. L. REv. 1217.
9. 18 STAT. 470 (1875). (Italics supplied). This provision was the ame as § 11 of
the original Judiciary Act. 1 STAT. 79 (1789).
10. 96 U. S. 369 (1877).
11. See Shaw v. Quincy 'Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 452 (1892); McLean v. Mis-
sissippi, 96 F. (2d) 741. 743 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; Bu.%xE, tip. cit. snrpra nwte 4, at 130;
Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. REYv. 591, 592, n. 13.
12. 24 ST.AT. 552 (1887), as corrected by 25 STrw. 433 (S), 2- U. S. C. 112
(1934). The venue statute does not apply to alien corporations, vwhich can bring suit
only in the district of the defendant's residence, but can b2 sued wherever found. Parrow
Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (1893); In re Hohor;t, 150 U. S. 653 (1893).
13. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444 (1892) ; In re Keasbhy Z .Mattison
Co., 160 U. S. 221 (1895) ; Seaboard Rice 'Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 270
U. S. 363 (1926); other cases cited in Neirbo Co. ct al. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
Ltd., 103 F. (2d) 765, 767 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). The Shaw case established that "citi-
zen," "inhabitant" and "resident" are used synonymously in the venue statute.
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the event that there were two or more districts in one state, the corporation
was considered a resident only of the district in which it had its principal
office.' 4 Consequently, the doing of business within a state other than that
of incorporation, regardless of the volume of operations, did not satisfy the
requirements for residence. It likewise seemed established by Southern Pacific
Company v. Denton'5 that, in view of the elimination of the "found" clause
in the new statute, the appointment of an agent for service of process was
not to be construed as a waiver of venue or a consent to be sued in the
federal courts.
The result of these decisions was to confer upon foreign corporations a
discriminatory privilege to determine the forum for their litigation. If an
action based on a federal question was brought against the corporation in
any district court of the state in which it was merely doing business, the
defendant corporation could have the action dismissed for improper venue
on the ground that it was not an inhabitant of the state.1 0 The foreign
corporation could likewise assert its venue privilege in diversity of citizen-
ship suits brought by non-residents in the state of its activities, since neither
the corporation nor the plaintiff was resident there.17 Although a plaintiff
could properly bring a diversity suit in the district of his residence against
a foreign corporation doing business in that district, he was effectively checked
- at least, until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938- if he tried to sue a corporation doing business in a different district
of the same state. Inasmuch as process could not run outside the bounds of
the district,' 8 he was unable to get service on the corporation through his
own district court. If he went out of his district to sue where the corpora-
tion was doing business, he could get service of process, but he might be
tripped on venue.19
This dilemma of the resident plaintiff in diversity cases was finally solved
by Rule 4(f) of the new Federal Rules. The provision for service of process
14. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496 (1894).
15. 146 U. S. 202 (1892). In this case, a citizen of the Eastern District of Texas
sued a Kentucky corporation in the Western District of Texas for negligence. The cor-
poration was doing business in the Western District and had appointed an agent for ser-
vice of process according to a state law which also required foreign corporations not to
resort to the federal courts. Although holding the statute unconstitutional because of the
latter provision, the Supreme Court went on to interpret the extent of the corporation's
agreement. In ruling that there was no waiver of venue by appointment of the agent, the
Court distinguished the Schollenberger case on the basis of the change in statute. This
ruling was made an alternative ground of decision in the case. See McLean v. Missis-
sippi, 96 F. (2d) 741, 744 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 623 (1938).
16. In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221 (1895) ; (suit by non-resident of
state); Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 215 U. S. 501 (1910) (suit by resi-
dent of state).
17. Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 270 U. S. 363 (1926).
18. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300 (U. S. 1838); Robertson v. Railroad Labor
Board, 268 U. S. 619 (1925); cf. Wefel v. W. P. Brown & Son Lumber Co,, 58 F. (2d)
667 (S. D. Ala. 1932).
19. Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202 (1892) ; see Hale, Venue of Suits
in Federal Courts Agast Non-Resident Corporations (1902) 5 LAw NoTEs 224; Com-
ment (1933) 11 TEx. L. REv. 359.
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"anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district
court" was held enabled him to bring the action in his own district, and still
get service over the corporation doing business in another district.9 The
other venue barriers to diversity suits brought by non-residents and to
federal question suits, however, could not be hurdled. Consequently, the
defendant corporation had its choice between the state and federal courts.
If the action was brought in the state court, it enjoyed the advantage of
removal to a federal tribunal. If the action was started in a federal court,
the corporation could of course waive venue at will and remain there.
-
But by a timely claim of privilege it could force the plaintiff either to sue in
the state court or else suffer the inconvenience of instituting a suit in the
district court of the state of incorporation. 22
In a recent decision,23 a divided Supreme Court checked this discriminatory
power of foreign corporations to select their place of trial.2 4 A New Jersey
stockholder brought an action against a New York corporation in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York to restrain the carry-
ing out of a contract to sell assets to Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd.
Upon the court's refusal to enjoin, plaintiff filed an amended and supplemental
bill asking that Bethlehem, a Delaware corporation doing business and having
an appointed agent for service in the Southern District of New York, be
joined as a party defendant. jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizen-
ship. Bethlehem made a special appearance to quash service on the ground
of improper venue under Section 51 of the Judicial Code,2 which, for pur-
poses of this suit,2-6 is similar to the 1887 venue statute. The district court
20. See MooRE's FED AL PRAcricE (1938) 360 et seq.
21. See note 8 supra. The foreign corporation, as a non-resident, has always en-
joyed the privilege of removal to the federal courts. The removal operates as a waiver
of the venue privilege. General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U. S. 261 (1922).
In Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 260 U. S. 653 (1922), removal vas allowed even though
the plaintiff, as well as the corporate defendant, was a non-resident of the district.
22. As a result many cases involving a federal question were doubtless kept out of
the federal courts.
23. Neirbo Co. et al. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 153 (U. S.
1939), (1940) 20 B. U. L. REv. 137.
24. The power to object to venue -as doubtless an aid in escaping some suits on the
basis of the statute of limitations. Similarly, a corporation which had asserted its venue
privilege in a federal court and subsequently been sued on the same action in a state
court, was probably not estopped from removing to the same district court to which it
had previously objected.
25. Venue privilege may now be asserted by a simple motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
26. The following amendment was added to § 51 in 1936: "... except that suit by
a stockholder on behalf of a corporation may be brought in any district in which suit
against the defendant or defendants in such stockholders' action, other than said corpora-
tion, might have been brought by such corporation and process in such cases may L2
served upon such corporation in any district wherein such corporation resides or may b2
found." 49 STAT. 1213 (1936), 28 U. S. C. § 112 (Supp. 1933).
If the present action were considered such a derivative action, it could clearly have
been disposed of solely by means of this amendment. Plaintiff stockholders had joined
their corporation, United Shipyards, Inc., as party defendant in their suit brought in the
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granted the motion, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in an
opinion that carefully restated existing law.2 7 Taking certiorari because of
a conflict between the views of this court and those of the Tenth Circuit, 8
the Supreme Court reversed the holding below. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
while accepting the doctrine that a corporation is a resident only of the state
of its incorporation, held for the majority that Bethlehem had waived its
venue privilege and consented to be sued in the Southern District of New
York by its appointment of the statutory agent to receive process.2 0 This
decision effectively overrules the holding of the Supreme Court in Southern
Pacific Company v. Denton,"° which had been followed almost uniformly by
the lower federal courts. 3' At the same time, it revives the old Schollenberqer
case as a precedent for venue actions under the present statute, but reinter-
prets the rationale of that case to be that appointment of a statutory agent
constitutes a consent to be sued, not merely a consent to be found. 
2
This judicial curb of privilege was evidently motivated by a desire to
realign the policy behind the venue statute with the actual position of a
Southern District of New York. Since United is a New York corporation with its prin-
cipal office in the Southern District, it could properly lay venue in that district in a
diversity suit against Bethlehem. Therefore the plaintiff stockholders could properly sue
Bethlehem in the Southern District, regardless of considerations of residence or waiver.
Neither the circuit court nor Supreme Court mentions this amendment in its statement
of § 51 or treatment of the problem. The only reference to it in briefs of counsel is a
footnote on page 2 of the circuit court brief of counsel for appellee Bethlehem, which
simply states that this is not a derivative suit, because of failure to comply with Equity
Rule 27 or Rule 23 (b) of the Federal Rules, and because the essential prayers are for
personal relief. But a contrary argument could have been made on the basis of the com-
plaint and of previous cases, if counsel were desirous of treating this as a derivative suit.
See Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 293 N. Y. Supp. 912 (2d Dep't 1937), affd wilthout opinion,
276 N. Y. 551, 12 N. E. (2d) 570 (1937) ; cf. Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A. (2d) 904 (Del.
1938). See MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 2246-2276, 2301-2303.
27. Neirbo Co. et al. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 103 F. (2d) 765 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1939).
28. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 100 F. (2d) 770 (C. C.
A. 10th, 1938). The Supreme Court has since handed down an opinion on this case, de-
ciding the venue point in accordance with the Neirbo ruling. Id., 60 Sup. Ct. 215 (U. S.
1939). See discussion in Neirbo Co. et al v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 103 F.
(2d) 765, 769 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
29. "Whether such surrender of a personal immunity be conceived negatively as a
waiver or positively as a consent to be sued, is merely an expression of literary prefer-
ence." Neirbo Co. et al. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 155
(U. S. 1939).
30. 146 U. S. 202 (1892) ; see note 15 supra.
31. See cases cited in Neirbo Co. et al. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 103 F.
(2d) 765, 769 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); also Hamilton Watch Co. v. George W. Borg Co.,
27 F. Supp. 215 (N. D. Ill. 1939); Toulmin v. James Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 512 (W. D.
N. Y. 1939) ; cf. it re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 229 (1895) ; Galveston, I-I.
& S. A. R. R. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496, 502 (1894).
32. Neirbo Co. et al. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 156
(U. S. 1939). The dissent, by Mr. Justice Roberts, opposes this result on grounds of
stare decisis and of Congress' tacit adherence to the court's former construction of the
statute.
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"foreign" corporation. The purpose of Section 51 is "to save defendants
from inconveniences to which they might be subjected if they could be com-
pelled to answer in any district, or wherever found. 'as When applied to
private individuals, the residence requirements supply a reasonable rule of
thumb. But in the case of corporate entities which are resident by legal
concept in one state, yet "localized" for all practical purposes in the state or
states of their business operations, convenience can scarcely be correlated
with residence. The effect of the pre-Neirbo rule was usually to provide a
dodge for the corporation rather than to insure an appropriate place for trial.
For an organization such as Bethlehem, formally incorporated in Delaware
but doing business and carrying out most of its corporate functions in the
Southern District of New York, it would seem that, ideally, venue should
be laid in New York. There is, of course, no grave public policy requiring
that such substantive legal problems as are involved in the instant action be
settled in the federal courts. But, inasmuch as the courts do have diversity
jurisdiction, the majority clearly reached an equitable result.
It is interesting to note that, whereas previous proposals to strip foreign
corporations of excessive privileges in the federal courts have sought to limit
jurisdiction, 4 the Neirbo case opens the door to more suits against such
corporations in these tribunals. The decision, even though stemming from an
action based solely on diversity, is equally applicable to those actions in-
volving a federal question 32 which formerly, under Section 51, could be
brought only in the district of the defendant's residence. Likewise, it might
well extend to suits arising under the special venue statutes which are de-
signedly less restrictive than Section 51.20 For example, a patent infringe-
ment suit can be brought in the district of the defendant's residence, or in
33. General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U. S. 261, 275 (1922).
34. The power of a foreign corporation to take its ordinary litigation to the federal
courts on diversity grounds, although carrying on the bulk of its business within the state
and enjoying substantially the equal protection of the laws, has been a constant source
of irritation to the local citizenry. Premised upon the unfairness of such a privilege, sev-
eral abortive attempts were made by the House of Representatives to close the courts to
diversity suits between foreign corporations and citizens of the states in which they were
doing business. See discussion of the Culberson Bills in FAmNTHURnER AITW LIsmm, Tim
BusiN-ss OF THE SUPEE COURT (1927) 89 ct seq. A recent attempt to limit federal
jurisdiction, which likewise failed of passage, was the Attorney General's Bill of 1932.
See Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts (1933) 19 A. B. A.
J. 499; Warren, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship (1933) 19 VA. L REv. 661.
Since Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), the advantages to be sought in
the federal courts, so far as substantive law is concerned, have probably been lessened.
Nevertheless, inducements such as an appointive judiciary and a different procedure may
still make the federal courts more attractive to corporations. See Shulman, The Demise
of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336.
35. In re Ieasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221 (1895).
36. For example, 36 STAT. 1100 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 105 (1934) (suits for internal
revenue taxes); 36 STAT. 1100 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 109 (1934) (patent suits). Those
sections which provide that a corporation may be sued in any district where "found" go
further than the Neirbo rule, and consequently are not affected by the decision. For e-:-
ample, 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U. S.C. § 22 (1934) (anti-trust actions); 35 STAT. 1034
(1909), 17 U. S. C. § 35 (1934) (copyright actions).
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the district where the defendant has committed the acts of infringement and
has a regular and established course of business.37 Since such an action arises
under a federal law, the Neirbo rule might be applied to lay the venue in a
district where the defendant corporation simply has an established course
of business and a statutory agent, obviating the necessity that the acts of
infringement also occur in that district. But it may be argued that such suits
are controlled only by the special patent section. Consequently, although ap-
pointment of an agent operates as a waiver of a general objection to venue
under Section 51, it does not eliminate those objections based on the specific
requirements of. the patent section. It may be further argued that the
decision relates only to suits subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the
federal and state courts.38 In the latter event, patent suits, which are subject
only to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts,39 are not affected.
To approve the result in the Neirbo case is not necessarily to approve the
argument employed to produce that result. Juristic symmetry is scarcely
expected when stare decisis is disturbed, but change should be justified by
sound argument. Mr. Justice Frankfurter rather obscures the fact that he
is overthrowing what had been considered established doctrine for many
years by the majority of courts and textwriters, alike. 40 The reasoning on
which he relies to carry the Schollenberger doctrine through the statutory
change which eliminated "found" from the venue section involves somewhat
strained interpretations both of that holding 4' and of the background of the
37. 36 STAT. 1100 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 109 (1934).
38. This argument may be somewhat strengthened by the provision in the patent
section that "If such suit is brought in a district of which the defendant is not an inhabi-
tant, but in which such defendant has a regular and established place of business, service
of process . . . may be made by service upon the agent . . . conducting such business
in the district in which suit is brought." 36 STAT. 1100 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 109 (1934).
It would seem that this provision has been added on the assumption that the ordinary
bases for service on a foreign corporation are not applicable to such suits.
39. 36 STAT. 1160 (1911), as amended, 42 STAT. 635 (1922), 28 U. S. C. §371(5)
,(1934).
40. See note 31 supra; DoniF, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PaocEDuRE
,(1928) 483; cf. WHEATON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRO-
.CEDURE (2d ed. 1938) 185n; BuNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF TnUE
UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1939) 71.
41. "But the crux of the [Schollenberger] decision is its reliance upon two earlier
,cases, Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65 . . . and Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 18 How. 404 . . . recognizing that 'consent' may give 'venue.'" 60 Sup. Ct. 153,
156 (U. S. 1939). The essential problem in the Lafayette case was whether a state court,
acting under a state statute authorizing service of process on the agent of a foreign cor-
poration doing business within the state, had the power to enter a valid in personam
judgment against such a corporation. The Harris case likewise appears to have been
concerned primarily with the problem of serving a foreign corporation that was theoreti-
cally "non-existent" where it was doing business. Both cases represent an attempt to
overcome the logical implications of Taney's doctrine by basing personal jurisdiction upon
the fiction of consent. See note 7 supra. But the proper service of process requisite for
an in personam judgment is distinct from, and does not dispense with, the requirements
for venue; nor does proper venue eliminate the necessity of obtaining personal jurisdic-




1887 venue statute.42 Basing waiver of federal venue on an appointment made
under a state law whose chief purpose is to provide for service of process
lends a further air of unreality to the Court's effort to replace "metaphor
with common sense."
The solution dictated by the Court's reasoning does not neatly tie up the
loose ends of the venue problem. Inasmuch as 47 states have statutes pro-
viding that all foreign corporations, in order to qualify to do business, must
appoint some sort of service agent 43 - either an actual agent or a public
official, or both - the rule will operate to include most corporate defendants.
44
But if the case is construed strictly, a discriminatory venue privilege may
still be reserved to those law-breaking foreign corporations which do business
without registering or appointing a statutory agent, and which can scarcely
be said to have "consented" to waive venue.4 u The opinion likewise indicates
the possibility of appointments of agents for service of process under the
express reservation of the corporation's venue privilege. If the state consents
to such appointments, the courts will have to determine whether the reserva-
tions circumvent the Neirbo rule. If such reservations are refused, then the
42. After discussing the attempt of the House of Representatives to bar from the
federal courts diversity suits between foreign corporations and citizens of the states in
which they were doing business, the majority opinion states: "It would be strange in-
deed if the House in § 1 had dealt with the 'venue' of suits against corporate litigants
who, like those involved in the Schollenberger case, by § 3 of the same bill were com-
pletely barred from the federal courts." 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 157 (U. S. 1939). But § 3 did
not bar all suits involving foreign corporations. Suits based on federal questions and di-
versity suits between a foreign corporation and a non-resident-the very situation in
the Neirbo case-could still be brought in the federal courts under that provision. See
note 46 infra.
43. See PARKER's CORPORATION MANUAL (41st ed. 1940) #49, 52. Georgia is the
only state that makes no special provision for service on fureign corporations. But it
appears that a foreign corporation can be served in the wvay provided for domestic cor-
porations. City Fire Insurance Co. v. Carrugi, 41 Ga. 660 (1371). For discussion of the
various types of statutes, see Culp, Constitutional Problems Arising from Serice of
Process on Foreign Corporations (1935) 19 Mrx.N. L. RE'. 375.
44. In their statutes dealing with foreign corporations, some states use words equiva-
lent to "consent to be sued," whereas others simply provide for "agent for service of
process." Since the Neirbo opinion clearly holds that the latter form is sufficient to cre-
ate a waiver of venue, the former is a fortiori effective. See Oklahoma Packing Co. v.
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 215, 219 (U. S. 1939) ; Neirbo Co. et al. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 103 F. (2d) 765, 769 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
45. The anomaly of such unlicensed foreign corporations enjoying an advantage over
registered corporations solely by reason of their failure to register has already been illus-
trated in the judicial treatment of actions arising outside the state of business activity. If
the corporation, in accordance with the statute, has appointed a public official to receive
process, the courts of the state have jurisdiction over all transactions no matter where
arising. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93
(1917) ; Smolik v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S. D. X. Y. 1915).
But if the corporation has not expressly appointed such official, it has not subjected itself
to causes of action arising from business not done within the state. Old Wayne Mut.
Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115
(1915).
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courts will be asked to decide whether the states are unconstitutionally depriv-
ing a corporation of a federal privilege as a condition of doing business.
It is admittedly difficult to conceive of a corporation as being a "resident"
anywhere. Since Congress used this term in a venue statute applicable to
individuals and corporations alike, however, the courts were forced to augment
its literal meaning by the fiction that corporate residence meant state of
incorporation. That this fiction, created to cope with the corporate entity
in its earlier stages, no longer fits the corporation full-grown was ignored in
the Neirbo decision. The Court chose to accept the anachronistic device and
to interpolate a further concept: appointment of an agent for service of process
according to state law constitutes a waiver of federal venue. There remain,
as a result, loopholes through which corporations might escape the Nrirbo
rule by registering with reservation of venue privileges or by failing to
register altogether.
The Supreme Court could have rested its decision on grounds considerably
more productive of certainty in the elimination of the discriminations which
it sought to erase. The opportunity was at hand peacefully to inter the out-
worn concept that a corporation is resident only in the state of its incor-
poration, and to erect in its place the more realistic doctrine that a corpora-
tion is resident, for purposes of venue, wherever it does business. 40 Such a
doctrine would go no further than the Neirbo rule, but would definitely shut
off the possible avenues of escape.4 7 Limited to venue, it would not necessarily
affect diversity of citizenship jurisdiction or prevent removal to the federal
courts by non-residents in diversity cases. 48 But it clearly would put venue
requirements upon a sound theoretical basis, consonant with the actual position
of the corporation and with principles of fair dealing.
46. Such a doctrine could be reconciled more readily than the Neirbo rule with the
House's repeated attempts to keep from the federal courts suits involving foreign cor-
porations and citizens of the state in which they were doing business. Evidently, the
theory behind such a provision was that a corporation doing business in a state is, at
least for purposes of suit, a citizen or resident of that state. The wording of the Attor-
ney General's Bill, designed to achieve the same end, would seem to confirm this. See
S. B. 937, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). Consequently, although the jurisdictional re-
strictions applied only to a limited set of cases, their basic theory could be assimilated
into the general venue requirements for such "foreign" corporations.
47. The doctrine would of course destroy a long line of cases. See note 13 .rpra.
But the court undertook in the Neirbo case to overthrow a rule established since 1892.
48. It is entirely possible that the same word may be used differently in two dif-
ferent statutes. In Lamar v. United States, 240 U. S. 60, 65 (1916), Mr. Justice Holmes
said: "The question is in what sense the word 'officer' is used in the Criminal Code .
The same words may have different meanings in different parts of the same act . .
See also American Surety & Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491, 494 (1912).
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RESERVATION OF MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS*
Ix 1938 the Supreme Court in Eric Railroad v. Tompkins' destroyed the
concept of a federal, or general, common law as it was applied to certain
civil cases.2 But the concept still exists in the field of federal criminal pro-
cedure.3 Neither the Rules of Decision Act,4 requiring federal courts to
follow state law wherever applicable, nor the Conformity Act,5 adopting state
procedure for federal courts, has been applied to criminal cases.0 Inasmuch
as Congress has seldom legislated on criminal procedure, 7 federal courts have
been forced to erect a federal common law to cover many procedural problems
arising in criminal prosecutions.8 That the judicial process of molding a
federal common law in criminal procedure is not without its regrettable
results in some instances is shown by a recent mandamus proceeding in
the Seventh Circuit.9
The proceeding arose out of the trial judge's action in the recent criminal
anti-trust prosecution against the major mid-western oil companies at Madi-
son, Wisconsin.?0 Following submission of the case to the jury and the
return of verdicts of guilty against forty-six defendants, the trial judge
*Ex parte United States, 101 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), aff'd ui hout opinion
by an equally divided court sub norm. United States v. Stone, 60 Sup. Ct. 177 (U. S.
1939).
1. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, are not included within the
limitation of the Tompkins case except in so far as the rules may include substantive law.
Cf. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 60 Sup. Ct. 201 (U. S. 1939).
3. Federal common law may exist in other fields such as bankruptcy, patents and
the like where federal courts in enforcing a purely federal right have to go beyond statu-
tory law. See Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L J. 1336,
1350. On the other hand, there are no federal common law crimes. United States v.
Hudson, 7 Cranch. 32 (U. S. 1812).
4. 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1934).
5. Rav. STAT. § 914 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 724 (1934). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure supposedly supersede the Conformity Act. See 1 MooRE, FErznAL PnAcrica
(1938) 37. But see Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedurea"
after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 34 ILL. L. Pv. 271, 289.
6. United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361 (U. S. 1851) (Rules of Decision Act in-
applicable). The Conformity Act is worded to apply only to civil actions.
7. A notable exception is the Act of February 24, 1933, as amended, 47 STAT. 904
(1933), 48 STAT. 399, 28 U. S. C. § 723a (1934), authorizing the Supreme Court to prom-
ulgate uniform rules for appeals in criminal cases.
8. For a general discussion of these problems .%ith reference to rules of evidence,
see Leach, State Law of Evidencc in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 HAn . L. REv. 554;
Comment (1934) 47 HARv. L. RE%. 853.
9. Ex parte United States, 101 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), aff'd without
opinion by an equally divided court sub norm. United States v. Stone, 60 Sup. Ct. 177
(U. S. 1939).
10. The merits of the case will be found in United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.),
23 F. Supp. 937 (W. D. Wis. 1938), rev'd sudb non:. United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), (1940) 49 YmL L J. 761.
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entertained and, several months later, granted motions to set aside the verdict
and dismiss the charge as to eleven defendants."1 After protests by Govern-
ment counsel had been entered, the judge issued two nunc pro tunc orders
to show that he had previously reserved decision on motions for directed
verdicts and that his dismissal of eleven defendants was in accordance with
the reservation on these motions and not pursuant to the motions to set aside
the verdict.12 The Government then sought a withdrawal of the judge's
orders and a reinstatement of the jury's verdict. Upon refusal of the trial
judge to retract his rulings, the Government, having no right of appeal,' 8
took the only available course. It sought a writ of mandamus from the circuit
court of appeals on the grounds that no reservation was in fact made and
that, with or without reservation, the trial judge had no power to enter a
verdict of acquittal. The circuit court of appeals set aside the first contention
of the Government by declaring that the trial judge's answer to the show
cause order,14 in which he stated that he did reserve decision, was conclusive.15
The appellate tribunal then answered the Government's second contention
by holding that a trial judge has power to acquit a defendant on a reserved
motion for directed verdict in a criminal trial.
Since the power to enter a verdict of acquittal on a reserved motion is
not derived from any federal legislation, the court had to ascertain the common
law on the subject. The source of federal criminal procedure, the court
decided, was the common law of the state in which the trial took place as
of the date of admission to the union.' 6 A dictum in a case in Wisconsin, the
state of the trial, was then cited as authorizing a trial judge to dismiss a
defendant notwithstanding the verdict.17 This approach is erroneous, however,
because in 1934 the Supreme Court in Funk v. United States'6 repudiated
the doctrine that the common law of the state as of the date of admission
should be followed and substituted a doctrine of a general common law by
which the federal courts may modernize criminal procedure "in the light of
general authority and sound reason."' 19 The purpose of the Funk case was,
11. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 24 F. Supp. 575 (W. D. Wis. 1938).
12. Transcript of Record 155, 156, United States v. Stone, 60 Sup. Ct. 177 (U. S.
1939).
13. The United States may appeal in a criminal case only from an order quashing,
setting aside, or sustaining a demurrer to an indictment; an order granting a motion in
arrest of judgment; or an order sustaining a special plea in bar, provided always that
the order is based upon the validity or construction of the statute upon which the indict-
ment is founded. 34 STAT. 1246 (1907), 18 U. S. C. § 682 (1934). Certiorari may, of
course, be applied for where an appellate court reverses a conviction.
14. In answer to the order to show cause why he should not be ordered to reinstate
the jury verdict, the trial judge set forth excerpts from the trial record which, the trial
judge maintained, showed that he had reserved decision on the motion. The circuit court
of appeals independently considered the facts and came to a similar conclusion.
15. The court relied on Thatcher v. Killits, 195 Fed. 471 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
16. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1892) was cited for this proposition.
17. State v. Meen, 171 Wis. 36, 39, 176 N. W. 70, 72 (1920).
18. 290 U. S. 371 (1933).
19. See Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, 335 (1892), quoted in Funk v. United
States, 290 U. S. 371, 376 (1933).
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obviously, to circumvent a static procedure unchanged from early common
law. Although it may be argued that this very purpose was served by the
circuit court's of appeals use of the Wisconsin dictum, such justification
ignores the basic premise of the Funk case - that the federal court make an
independent judgment in determining the applicable procedure. To follow a
Wisconsin court strictly as authority is to accept blindly that court's deter-
mination as to the acceptable modem procedure and to deny the independence
of federal procedure from state practice.
The circuit court of appeals did not, however, content itself with accepting
the Wisconsin rule. An independent consideration of the common law was
also undertaken to justify the trial judge's reservation. Here the court was
faced with the fact that a motion for directed verdict had apparently never
been reserved in criminal cases either in England at common law or in this
country outside of Wisconsin. Not until 1848, when Parliament created the
Court of Crown Cases Reserved, 0 could an English court correct an error
once the jury had returned a verdict.2 1 Previously, periodic informal meetings
of all the trial judges were held at which were considered errors committed
at trial by any one of them. If the judges decided that a conviction was in
fact an erroneous one, a pardon was recommended to the king.2 This peculiar
practice, the circuit court of appeals explained, was enforced Iby the judges
out of fear of offending the crown, a condition which did not exist in this
country; consequently, there was no reason for American courts to distinguish
between early English criminal procedure, where the judge could not dismiss
the defendant, and early English civil procedure where the judge could
reserve a motion for directed verdict.P In the absence in this country of a
struggle between king and judiciary, therefore, criminal procedure should be
the same as civil procedure.
There are, however, two difficulties with this facile solution of the problem.
In the first place, the principal value of a reserved motion in a civil action
is that it permits the appellate court to dispose of the case without ordering
a new trial.24 Its use, so far as federal courts are concerned, is to circumvent
the objection that disposition of the case on appeal is contrary to the provision
for trial by jury in civil cases.2 Yet in criminal cases the reservation does
not appear to be necessary. Appellate courts have often discharged defendants
because of erroneous denial of a directed verdict.20 Consequently, adoption
of the civil procedure by analogy seems unconvincing when the reason for
20. 11 & 12 Vicr. c. 78 (1848).
21. See 1 STEPHEN, HiSTORY OF THE CRINA-,.L L.ow OF ENGLaN.D (183) 311.
22. Ibid.
23. See Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654, 659 (1935) for a discussion
of early English civil procedure.
24. Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654 (1935).
25. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364 (1913), held that where a
motion for directed verdict was erroneously denied, the appellate court could only reverse
and remand for a new trial. Otherwise, the right to trial by jury would be denied.
26. France v. United States, 164 U. S. 676 (1S97) ; Romanov. United States, 9 F.
(2d) 522 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) ; Merrill v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 669 (C C. A. 9th,
1938) semble. Contra: Collenger v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
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using the procedure is not present. In the second place, outside of Wisconsin,
it does not appear that state judges follow a practice of reserving motions
on directed verdicts in criminal cases.2 7 If the doctrine in the Funk case is
limited to the proposition that federal courts "look to the spirit of modern
legislation, and to the trend of decisions both federal and state to determine
what is the true and enlightened rule,"' 28 there is considerable question
whether the trial judge's action in the principal case is in accord with the
"true and enlightened" rule. A strongly reasoned justification should be
required to introduce a novel procedure deemed unnecessary in almost all
states.
If, however, the Funk rule is broadened to include the doctrine that federal
courts are completely free to adopt any procedure commensurate with the
spirit of the common law, then it is necessary to examine more closely the
trial judge's action to see whether it is acceptable as an innovation in federal
criminal trials. The first question to be answered is whether the Funk rule
should be extended beyond its original purpose, the liberalization of the
rules of evidence, and used to permit a procedural reform vitally affecting
the Government's rights in a criminal case. The Funk case was an example
of judicial legislation in a situation where Congress had been grossly negligent
in failing to abolish antiquated rules of evidence.2 9 With state criminal pro-
cedure long since moved far beyond federal practice, it would be too much
to expect federal judges to ignore modern trends when an opportunity for
reform arose. The problem of the reserved motion for directed verdict is
a different matter. Here judicial legislation is further increasing the powers
of a trial judge in a class of cases in which the prosecution has few rights.
The absence of right to appeal places the Government at the mercy of the
trial judge.30 To permit a judge to dismiss defendants five months after trial,
as in the principal case, is to increase further the Government's subjugation
to the irremediable caprice of a trial judge.
It may be argued, of course, that the power to reserve a motion for directed
verdict is only a matter of form because the legal basis for directing a verdict
does not change with the passage of time. What is sufficient to set aside a
verdict after trial is sufficient to direct a verdict before the jury retires.
Although true in the abstract, this argument overlooks factors which make
it possible that a trial judge might direct a verdict on a reserved motion where
he would not have during trial. If he is at all in doubt at the conclusion of
the trial, he may decide not to direct a verdict, but to send the case to the
jury, because in the event the jury fails to acquit, he still has an opportunity
27. This cannot be proved, of course. There is a negative inference to be drawn
from the fact that treatises on criminal procedure and criminal law do not mention it,
and that neither the district judge nor the circuit court of appeals cites either case or
statute authorizing it. In State v. Bossio, 136 Wash. 232, 234, 239 Pac. 553, 554 (1925),
the court mentions that by agreement of counsel and judge argument on a motion for
directed verdict was postponed until after verdict. The question was not in issue, how-
ever, and the court does not even by dictum approve the procedure.
28. Ex parte United States, 101 F. (2d) 870, 877 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
29. See Comment (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 853.
30. See note 13 supra.
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to grant a new trial should he believe the verdict erroneous. If he waits, how-
ever, the doubts may be removed because the impression of witnesses' credi-
bility will be lost in a "cold" record, or because careful study of the record
may lead to conclusions different from those reached as the case unfolds at
trial. On the other hand, this danger in reviewing a "cold" record is avoided
on appeal by a natural advantage to the party who won in the court below.31
It is quite likely, therefore, that many times during trial the judge would
deny a motion to direct a verdict where he might alter his opinion if he had
more time to study the record. In such a case the defendant is protected by
his privilege to move for a new trial32 or to appeal. The Government, on
the other hand, is protected from an erroneous dismissal which the judge
might order after verdict.
Apart from the importance of protection to the Government, other con-
siderations make the action of the trial judge in the principal case of doubtful
value. In the first place, his subsequent review of the case upsets the allocation
of power between trial court and appellate court. With sufficient provision
for appellate review, there seems no reason to require a trial judge to neglect
his trial work in order to review his own case. In the second place, a trial
judge, secure in the knowledge that he can review the case for error, may
tend to be less attentive in the conduct of the trial. The necessity for ruling
at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence on a motion for directed
verdict will require close attention to all aspects of the trial; if the ruling is
to be based on the transcript of the trial, the judge may be careless about
excluding evidence because he knows that upon reviewing the transcript he
can discount any erroneous admission.
There appears to be only one strong argument offered in favor of granting
a judge power to defer his ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. It is
supposed to give him time in a difficult case to study the record more thor-
oughly without having to keep the jury sequestered.as It is true, of course,
that there were forty-six defendants in this anti-trust suit, that the evidence
was extremely complex and that a hasty ruling might be erroneous . 4 Yet
an anti-trust suit is just the type of action which ought not to be subjected
to the ruling of a trial judge where no appeal can be taken.m a Anti-trust
prosecution involves an important public policy which should be unified and
coordinated by similar judicial enforcement across the country. As an aid
to obtaining unified enforcement, the Government needs an extensive privilege
31. The advantage to the appellee is a practical, not a legal, one. Such factors as the
fact that one trial has already been held. that litigation should be brought to an end, that
the appellate court cannot consider all possible errors, and that the trial judge must th
given some discretion affect the disposition of a case on appeal.
32. See United States v. Lowenstein, 126 Fed. 884 (E. D. Pa. 1904), %,here the trial
judge granted a new trial and told the Government not to bother with another prosecu-
tlion unless more evidence could be produced.
33. See (1939) 25 'VA. L. REv. 987.
34. The trial lasted for over three months and the transcript of the trial contained
"some twelve thousand pages of evidence and over one thousand exhibits." Transcript of
Record 165, United States v. Stone, 60 Sup. Ct. 177 (U. S. 1939).
35. Cf. FAIRMAN, M.R. JUSTICE MTILLER AxD THE SUPREME Corm (1939) 90, n. 42.
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of review by appellate courts. The trial judge's ruling in the principal case,
however, is one more step in the process of destroying what limited oppor-
tunity the prosecution has to coordinate its policy.3 0
In view of the conceded complexity of anti-trust suits, and perhaps of
other criminal suits as well, there may be considerable justification for the
grant of power to a trial judge to defer his ruling. Such a grant should,
however, be accompanied by protection to the Government by way of a right
to appeal.3 7 Otherwise, as in the principal case, the result is to increase a trial
judge's power without a corresponding appellate review which the Govern-
ment can invoke. judicial legislation, though an accepted mode of molding
law, seems singularly inappropriate when it results in an increase of power
in lower federal courts at the expense of efficient prosecution.38
DISPARITIES IN TIME LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL
CAUSES OF ACTION*
FEDERAL statutes conferring private rights typically fail to provide periods
of time limitation during which such rights must be asserted.' To resolve
the dilemma created by Congressional inaction, the Supreme Court has
declared that in the absence of an applicable federal statute of limitations,
that of the state in which the district court is situated must be applied, though
the cause of action arise solely under federal law.2 In attempting to rectify
legislative inertia, the Court has supplied at least a workable and definite
solution to the problem raised thereby. Yet the result is not a completely
satisfactory one. Quite apart from mere difficulties of application in par-
ticular instances, more fundamental inconsistencies, both in legal theory and
practical effect, lurk in the doctrine. An attempt to use the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to escape the incidence of the rule in a recent case3
36. Contrast the attitude of Judge Lindley, in denying a motion for directed verdict
in the criminal prosecution of the General Motors Corporation, where he said he would
permit the case to go to the jury without deciding whether the facts were sufficient in
law, because he did not feel he should destroy the Government's chances of having the
question passed on by the Supreme Court. N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1939, p. 16, col. 4.
37. An appeal from a verdict of acquittal on a reserved motion would probably not
involve double jeopardy because the appellate court would not need to order a new trial
but could reinstate the jury's verdict of guilty. In fact, even allowing a new trial after
appeal by the government on a verdict of not guilty may be found not to contravene the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. See the comments of Mr. Justice
Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 323 (1937).
38. This objection applies even more strongly to the argument, used by the circuit
court of appeals in the principal case, that the trial judge possesses "inherent power" to
reserve a motion for a directed verdict.
*Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., (1940) 8 U. S. L. WFXX 15 (C. C.
A. 3d, Dec. 21, 1939), aff'g, 27 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1939).
1. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrice (1938) 240.
2. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610 (1895).
3. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., (1940) 8 U. S. L. WEEK 15 (C.
C. A. 3d, Dec. 21, 1939), aff'g, 27 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1939).
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invites an examination of the possible utility of this and other devices to
evade or correct its imperfections.
On the ground of the statute of limitations, defendant moved to dismiss
an action for triple damages brought under the Clayton Act 4 in the federal
district court of Delaware. No federal statute of limitations was applicable;
Delaware provides a three-year limitation for actions on the case.0 It was
stipulated that the right of action had accrued more than three years previous
to the commencement of suit. Plaintiff argued that since the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure abolish common law forms and provide for but one form
of action to be known as a civil action," a statute limiting actions "upon the
case" is inapplicable.' The court rejected this argument and granted defend-
ant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the substance and not the form of
action is decisive. Had the framers of the rules intended the extreme result
propounded by plaintiff, they would, thought the court, have explicitly so
stated.
In rejecting as specious the theory advanced to defeat defendant's motion
to dismiss, the court was on solid doctrinal ground. When states have sub-
stituted code pleading for common law forms of action, existing statutes
of limitations have continued to prevail, affecting not the form but the
substance of the cause of action stated.7 Any other result would be at variance
with the theory and practice of code pleading orthodoxy.8 Moreover, it is
well settled that an action for triple damages under the Clayton Act is
substantially one of case.9
Yet despite the invalidity of the plaintiff's argument in the instant case,
the unsatisfactory nature of the doctrine requiring application of state limi-
tation statutes to actions brought under federal law becomes accentuated in
the light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Uniformity and simplicity
are their twin objectives.' 0 One area in which uniformity would seem most
essential is in the operation of federal statutes giving substantive rights to
private parties. Instead, there are as many different time limits upon such
causes of action as there are distinct state statutes of limitations. The prac-
tical result is obvious: one who has delayed in asserting a federal right
4. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1934).
5. D. REv. CoDE (1935) § 5129.
6. FED. RuLEs CIV. PROc. 2. "There shall be one form of action to be movM as
'civil action.'"
7. Hermes v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 213 App. Div. 147, 210 N. Y. Supp. 114
(Ist Dep't 1925); Note (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 50S. Nor should the relief sought by
plaintiff complicate the applicability of the substantially appropriate statute of limitations.
Model Building & Loan Ass'n of Mott Haven v. Reeves, 236 N. Y. 331, 140 N. E. 715
(1923).
S. El Paso v. West, 104 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Hickey v. Slattery,
103 Conn. 716, 131 Ad. 558 (1926); Miner v. McNamara, 82 Conn. 578, 74 Ad. 933
(1909); Frechette v. Ravn, 145 Wis. 589, 130 N. W. 453 (1911); ef. Mo., Kans. and
Tex. Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570 (1913). See CLARK, CODE PMauD.ING (1923) § 18.
9. H. J. Jaeger Research Laboratories v. Radio Corp. of America, 90 F. (2d) 826
(C. C. A. 3d, 1937). Plaintiff's argument in the instant case that his action was one of
debt on a specialty was given extensive consideration by the court.
10. See 1 -MooP,, FEDERAL PRocanuna § 0.01 and passim.
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may still prevail if his adversary is subject to suit in a district where the
state provides a sufficiently generous time limit." Otherwise his action is
barred. Such disparity in its operation could hardly have been intended
by the frarers of a supposedly uniform federal statute.
If the rule itself defeats the ideal of uniformity, practical difficulties in
its application destroy that of simplicity. The question must invariably arise
as to which of the many limitation periods provided by the state is applicable.
To this end federal courts have been called upon to consider, inter alia,
whether stockholders' liability under the National Banking Act was statutory
or contractual,' 2 whether infliction of injury caused by violation of the
Safety Appliance Act raised a liability "for personal injury" or one "created
by statute,"' 1 3 whether an action for triple damages under the anti-trust laws
was for a statutory penalty or the infliction of injury,14 and whether suit
for injuries resulting from violation of the national election laws was for
damages or for a penalty. 1 Upon such exiguous and seemingly academic
distinctions has often depended the disposition of federal causes of action.
Another difficulty which has been raised is the effect to be given in the
federal courts to the "borrowing" statute of limitations of a state.10 Since
the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a third question which
has threatened trouble and excited comment is that of when an action is
"commenced" in the federal courts for the purpose of tolling the appropriate
limitation statute.
1 7
11. On occasion the courts have frankly recognized that plaintiff brought his federal
action in a given jurisdiction for the very purpose of taking advantage of an indulgent
state limitation. See Bluefields S. S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 Fed. 1, 20 (C. C. A.
3d, 1917) (action for triple damages under Sherman Act brought in Pennsylvania for
this purpose. A wider choice of forums seems now available for actions under some
federal statutes (e.g., patent infringement suits). See Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., Ltd., 60 Sup. Ct. 153 (U. S. 1939), (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 724.
12. McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154 (1905) (statutory).
13. Nichols v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 195 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912) ("created
by statute").
14. Shelton Electric Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 277 Fed. 433 (D. N. J.
1922) (injury inflicted).
15. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 319 (1914) (question whether federal limitations
statute or that of Louisiana was applicable). For an analogous problem, see Glenn Coal
Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F. (2d) 885, 890 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
16. That is, a state statute which provides that no action may be entertained in its
courts if it is barred by a statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action
arose. See Bluefields S. S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 Fed. 1, 20 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917) ;
Gallagher v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568 (E. D. N. Y. 1939) (jurisdiction founded on diver-
sity). In both these cases such statutes were involved, but in each the court was able
to sidestep a decision of their effect. For decision of an analogous question, see Metcalf'
v. Watertown, 153 U. S. 671 (1894).
17. Gallagher v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). FED. RuLEs Civ.
PROc. 3 provides "a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
Some states provide that action is commenced by service of summons (e.g., N. Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT § 218). The instant case temporarily allays fears that federal courts would
bow to state practice in this matter. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 3.06; Comment
(1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 1087; Note (1938) 12 TULANE L. REv. 643.
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These inherent inconsistencies and sources of pragmatic difficulty the
courts have complicated even further. Though under Supreme Court man-
date not to interfere with a state statute of limitations unless the time allowed
is so short as to deprive the parties of a reasonable opportunity to protect
their rights,'8 federal courts have sought escape from the rigidity of limita-
tions statutes in various ways. With numerous state limitation periods from
which to choose, courts have been able to exercise in legal actions a sub-
stantial degree of discretion in deciding whether or not the federal right
is barred.19 This exercise of discretionary selection, though motivated by
an understandable desire not to withhold relief in appropriate instances, has
detracted even further from the semblance of consistency.20 Another highly
important escape device open to the courts is provided by the theory that
in equity the otherwise appropriate limitations statute is applicable only by
analogy; the court is free to disregard it in any instance where the plaintiff
appears not in fact guilty of laches. 2 1 The doctrine has been called insig-
nificant,22 but an examination of recent decisions would seem to indicate
that such is not the case.2 3 Though justifiable to promote fairness in individual
cases, the concept appears to create a situation quite contrary to the purposes
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It tends substantially to frustrate
the desired union of law and equity; indeed it has created a source of pressure
upon the courts to classify causes as equitable which upon traditional criteria
could hardly be so categorized. 24
Defects so substantial in the rule applying state limitation statutes to causes
of action arising under federal law justify a critical examination of the origin
and rationale of the rule. It is suggested that such an examination will pro-
vide an argumentative basis for reaching the result contended for by the
plaintiff in the principal case, upon grounds quite distinct from those he
asserted.
18. Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245 (1890). This would normally be the situation
only in the case where a new, shorter limitation has been imposed on an already e.dsting
cause of action.
19. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1905) (three
state limitations and one federal from which to choose); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S.
154 (1905) ; Nichols v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 195 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912) ; Shel-
ton Electric Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 277 Fed. 433 (D. N. J. 1922).
20. For example, compare Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S.
390 (1906) (action under anti-trust laws held neither for statutory penalty nor for in-
juries) with Shelton Electric Co. v. Victor Talking 'Machine Co., 27 Fed. 433 (D. X.
J. 1922) (action under anti-trust laws held not for statutory penalty but for injuries
inflicted).
21. Todd v. Russell, 104 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). Plaintiff in an equity
suit may be barred by laches though the statute of limitations has not run. Abraham v.
Ordway, 158 U. S. 416 (1895).
22. See Comment (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 341.
23. Todd v. Russell, 104 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Partridge v. Ainley, 23
F. Supp. 472 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Holmberg v. Anchell, 24 F. Supp. 594 (S. D. D. Y.
1938).
24. See dissenting opinion in Todd v. Russell, 104 F. (2d) 169, 175 (C. C. A. 2d,
1939).
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Though it was early decided that federal courts must apply state limita-
tion statutes in cases where their jurisdiction is concurrent with state courts,2 5
the Supreme Court was long silent upon the question of whether the same
rule should apply when jurisdiction is exclusively federal. The weight of
authority in the circuit courts supported the position that a federal cause
of action could not be limited by a state statute of limitations.20 This position
was repudiated and the present rule expounded when in Campbell v. Haver-
hill2 7 the Supreme Court decided that the Massachusetts limitation for torts
barred an action in a federal court for patent infringement, in the absence
of an applicable federal limitations statute.2 8 The basis of the doctrine is
the Rules of Decision Act.2 9 The Court was unmoved by the argument that
that Act is inappropriate since it requires United States courts to regard
state laws as rules of decision only "in cases where they apply." 80 It was
argued that the states were powerless to limit rights of action which they
had not created and over which they had no jurisdiction, and that therefore
their limitation statutes did not "apply" to federal substantive rights. Troubled
by the prospect of actions without time limit, the Court ruled that the
'distinction' drawn by plaintiff was not of sufficient magnitude to outweigh
the beneficent purposes of limitations statutes.81 Thereafter the rule itself
seems never to have been seriously questioned.32
The argument advanced against the rule at its inception might well have
prevailed. 3 Another, attractive at least as a syllogization, becomes available
25. Beatty v. Burnes, 8 Cranch. 98 (U. S. 1814) ; McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270
(U. S. 1830) ; Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 How. 522 (U. S. 1850) ; Bacon v. Howard,
20 How. 22 (U. S. 1857).
26. Briclill v. Hartford, 49 Fed. 372 (C. C. Conn. 1892). Contra: Hayden v. Orien-
tal Mills, 15 Fed. 605 (C. C. R. I. 1883).
27. 155 U. S. 610 (1895).
28. The general Patent Act of 1870 had provided a time limitation for infringement
suits, 16 STAT. 206, § 55 (1870). The clause was omitted, however, in the compilation of
the Revised Statutes (1875).
29. REv. STAT. § 721 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1934).
30. "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or stat-
utes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." Rxv. STAT. §721 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §725 (1934).
31. The court quoted the eulogistic characterization of time limitations from Mr.
Justice Story's opinion in Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 360 (U. S. 1828). But even if one
agree that a statute of limitations is "a wise and beneficial law," it does not follow that
that of the state should control federal causes of action.
32. Though litigation has flourished as to its applicability in particular instances.
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 319 (1914); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906) ; Todd v. Russell, 104 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
33. The court in Campbell v. Haverhill nowhere satisfactorily answered plaintiff's
argument. See note 31 supra. His reasoning had previously been accepted by a majority
of the circuit courts. See note 26 supra. Moreover it appears to have been previously
settled that the Rules of Decision Act did not operate to make state survival statutes
apply to causes of action arising solely under federal law, a highly analogous situation.
"[The Rules of Decisions Act] . . . refers to cases where the federal courts obtain juris-
diction by reason of the citizenship of parties, and has no application to those cases in
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since passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision in
Campbell v. Haverhill was based upon the Rules of Decision Act, a statute
which is said to apply not to matters of procedure, but only to those of
substance. 34 Yet in branches of the law where it has been necessary to
make a formal classification, statutes of limitations have been called pro-
cedural.3 5 It would follow, even assuming the desirability of the doctrine
under discussion, that in the interests of consistency its basis should be not
the Rules of Decision Act, but the Conformity Act, which requires federal
courts to follow the states in matters of procedure.3A If it be conceded that
this Act is the proper basis for the rule, it then could be argued that the
rule is no longer in effect, in view of the frequently made statement that
the Conformity Act has been repealed by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.
37
Had the plaintiff in the principal case advanced the argument herein sug-
gested, he would have been on verbally defensible ground, yet to prestune
which the jurisdiction of the court arises out of the cause of action, and consequently
involves rights over which the State legislature can exercise no authority . . . [Other-
wise] . . . there would be one rule of action in this respect governing copyright suits
in one state, and another in other states, dependent upon local legislation respecting the
survival of action." Schreiber v. Sharpless, 17 Fed. 5S9 (E. D. Pa. 1893).
34. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 185); McBride v. Neal, 214 Fed.
966 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914); Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (B. D. I11. 1933).
35. Notably in the conflict of laws. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 327 (U.S.
1839). "Ordinary limitations of action are treated as laws of procedure and as belonging
to the lex fori, as affecting the remedy only and not the right." See Davis v. Mills, 194
U. S. 451, 454 (1904). RSsTATE,,sm-wT, CoNFLIcT or L.-ws (1934) §§603-604; 3 Bruxz,
CoNFLIcT or LAws (1935) §§ 603-604; see Comment (1936) 14 Nm . Buut. 267.
A statute of limitations becomes substantive when it is so identified with a right of
action as to be inseparable therefrom. Davis -.. Mills, 194 U. S. 451 (1904) ; see Greg-
ory v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 Fed. 113 (C. C. Ore. 1907). RsvA'rmranT, Corucr
or LAws (1934) § 605. This exception to the general rule that limitation statutes are
procedural is highly important in the conflict of laws and in some other connections. See
CLAPX, CODE PLEADING (1928) § 95; Atidnson, Pleading the Slaluite of Li tations
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 914. It is when statutes which create the right place a time limit
upon the remedy that the limitation is said to be substantive. Obviously the exception is
of no importance to the problem under discussion, since states cannot create federal rights.
The statutes of limitations of the states which the federal courts have applied to federal
causes of action are therefore invariably general ones, and invariably "procedural."
36. "The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes,
other than equity and admiralty causes, in the district courts, shall conform, as near as
may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the
time in like causes in the courts of record of the State vthin which such district courts
are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding." Rv. STAT. § 914 (1875),
28 U. S. C. 724 (1934). For a critical discussion of the operation of the Conformity Act,
see Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 853.
37. Green v. Me-Tex Supply Co., 29 F. Supp. 851 (S. D. Te.. 1939); cf. Kuenzel
v. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co., 29 F. Supp. 407 (E. D. Pa. 1939); 1 M1.oar,
FhDEA PPAMcCE (1938) 36; 3 id. 3443-3444; Fed. Rules Serv. Commentary, 1.11;
Chadbourn, Book Review (1939) 87 U. or PA. L. REv. 633. But see Tunhks, Categorica-
tion and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompin
(1939) 34 IL. L. Rnv. 271.
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that such an argument would have prevailed is little short of fantastic. For
too long the courts have paid lip service to the proposition that it is the
Rules of Decision Act which supports the doctrine, with but one isolated
case indicating a possible recent deviation from that rationale.3 8 Moreover,
rectification of the apparent inconsistency at this late date would result in
confusion. In the first place there can be no doubt that in instances where
jurisdiction of the federal courts is concurrent with that of the states, as in
diversity of citizenship cases, the state statute of limitations should prevail.
For here not uniformity but conformity is the ideal. Yet, if the argument
be accepted, the applicability of state limitations would be completely subject
to judicial discretion in such cases.39
Secondly, it is difficult to see how the desideratum of uniformity could be
achieved in federal causes of action by mere judicial repudiation of the
Campbell v. Haverhill rule. If the doctrine were rejected, on the grounds
suggested or on any other grounds, federal rights would be left with no
apparent time limitation upon them, - the in terroren; exigency which was
the rule's genesis. 40 Actually in such a situation, at least two devices would
be available by which the courts could set up a temporal bar, - neither com-
pletely satisfactory. The twenty-year common law presumption would make
for uniformity but would provide a longer period than is generally considered
advisable. 41 The flexible doctrine of laches would be available, as now, in
all cases historically equitable, and, since the consummated union of law
and equity, conceivably in every "civil action; ' '42 but this practice would
hardly promote uniformity. A third possibility would be discretionary incor-
poration of state limitations, 43 precisely the unsatisfactory situation which
is now mandatory.
38. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 131 (1938). In deciding that
the New York limitation runs against the United States suing in a federal court as as-
signee of a foreign government, the Court nowhere mentions the Rules of Decision Act.
The Conformity Act is mentioned twice. The first reference may deal with the manner
of pleading the statute of limitations, but it is difficult to explain the second reference on
those grounds: "Respondent argues [that it is] . . . not subject to statutes of limita-
tions, and its immunity as in the case of a domestic sovereign constitutes an implied ex-
ception to that statute and to the Conformity Act." (Italics supplied).
39. Under FED. RULES CIv. PRoc. 83, district courts are given discretion to regulate
their practice in all cases not provided for by rule, in any manner not inconsistent with
the Federal Rules.
40. What expressly motivated the decision in Campbell v. Haverhill was the pros-
pect of federal rights of action extending indefinitely.
41. The -presumption is apparently rebuttable. See Dowthwaite v. Tibbut, 5 M. & S. 75
(K. B. 1816). The British statute of James I limited actions of case to six years. Amer-
ican statutes are roughly comparable but tend to be shorter for most civil actions. It
could be argued that the English statutes passed before 1776 might be available as part
of the inherited common law.
42. It has been suggested that the doctrine of laches should be available in no "civil
actions," even those historically equitable. See Partridge v. Ainley, 28 F. Supp. 472 (S.
D. N. Y. 1939). It could be argued as defensibly that the doctrine should be available in
all "civil actions," even those historically legal. See Holsz v. Stephen, 362 Ill. 527, 200
N. E. 601 (1936) ; Noel v. Teffeau, 116 N. J. Eq. 446, 174 Atl. 145 (Ch. 1934) ; Notes
(1935) 4 AERCER BEASLEY L. Rzv. 92, (1937) 15 TEX. L. REv. 262, (1930) 9 Tx. L.
REv. 93.
43. See note 39 supra.
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Elsewhere, it would appear, must be sought the possibility of correcting
the present doctrine's defective operation. Two agencies suggest themselves.
If time limitations are procedural, theoretically the Supreme Court could
provide them under the authority by which the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were promulgated.44 Yet without an express reversal of the Rules
of Decision Act rationale, recent analogous decisions make it improbable that
such rules of limitation would be followed by the district courts, since they
might still be considered "substantive."4 l Further, the Court might be ex-
tremely reluctant to set up time limitations, even assuming its desire to do
so, since this function, except in equity causes, has traditionally been legis-
lative. Nor have the federal courts manifested particular displeasure with
the prevailing doctrine. One quite simple remedial device, application of an
already existing federal statute of limitations, the Supreme Court has long
since rejected.4 6
In Congressional action lies, apparently, the only possibility of a com-
pletely satisfactory solution. Were the Supreme Court to disclaim the Rules
of Decision Act rationale as a basis for the current doctrine, the pressure
upon Congress to pass a general statute of limitations would be great. But
even if such improbable judicial action does not materialize, it is not entirely
utopian to anticipate legislative rescue. Already there are several specific
federal statutes of limitations, and one of seeming generalit. 47 The impact
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will increasingly aggravate the
inconsistencies of the present situation, in cases where existing limitations
are not applicable. To pass an all-embracing federal statute of limitations
would be a simple legislative procedure, uncomplicated by political implica-
tions.48 Such legislation would render substantial service to the even-handed
operation of federal law.
49
44. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. §§ 723b. 723c (1934).
45. The argument would be that the Rule of Decision Act basis of Campbell v. Ha-
verhill indicates that statutes of limitation are substantive, at least for this purpoze.
Therefore conformity to state limitations would be required, despite the Federal Rules.
Since Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), the federal rule as to pleading con-
tributory negligence has met such a fate. Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. 1 (E. D.
Ill. 1938) ; cf. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 60 Sup. Ct. 201 (U. S. 1939). Yet dictum
in the principal case indicates the court would follow limitations covered by the federal
rules if any were provided. For criticism of a rigid categorization of substance and pro-
cedure, see Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1932) 42 YI.,Ln
L. J. 333.
46. REv. STAT. § 1047 (1875). 28 U. S. C. § 791 (1934) provides a five year limita-
tion on any suit for a penalty or forfeiture under federal law. A liberal construction
could have made this a general limitation for all federal actions not specifically othervise
limited. The Court, however, has construed the act narrowly. Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh
V. R. R., 236 U. S. 412 (1915) ; O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 319 (1914) ; Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906).
47. See note 46 supra.
48. By the same token, unfortunately, . . . procedure seldom makes a capital po-
litical issue, so real progress comes slowly and rarely." 1 MooRE, FEDMAL PrOAricE
(1938) 2.
49. Upon occasion the Supreme Court has manifested a desire for uniformity in lim-
itation of federal rights. Kansas C. S. Ry. v. Wolf, 261 U. S. 133, 139 (1923).
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APPLICATION OF SECTION 7(d) OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANY ACT TO "NEW MONEY" SECURITY ISSUES*
FEDERAL attempts at investor protection through control over corporate
issues of securities have, for the most part, been confined to the disclosure
provisions' of the Securities Act of 1933.2 But this program offers limited
protection to the small investor, who, no matter how well informed, lacks
the training and judgment to make an intelligent decision on the investment
merits of securities.3 Attempts at more extensive safeguards have been made
in the limited field embraced by the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, 4 which seeks, inter alia, to prevent the creation or extension of un-
balanced financial structures which might lead to reorganization and resultant
investor loss. 5
Most important of the statutory standards of the Holding Company Act0
under which the Securities and Exchange Commission1 may regulate financial
* Consumers Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1854, Dec. 28, 1939.
1. Fraudulent transactions are also regulated. SEcURITiEs AcT OF 1933, § 17, 48
STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77q (Supp. 1938).
2. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77(a) (Supp. 1938).
3. Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 YALE L. J.
171; Douglas, Protecting the Investor (1934) 23 YALE REV. 521, 523 et seq.; Berle,
High Finance: Master or Servant (1933) 23 YALE REV. 20, 42.
4. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1938). Broadly stated, this Act
embraces public utility holding companies in interstate commerce and their subsidiaries.
5. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77aaa
(Supp. 1939), must also be considered as an extension of investor protection beyond the
limits of the Securities Act of 1933. The provisions of that Act are designed to safeguard
bondholders by requiring minimum protective measures in indentures and assuring re-
sponsible trustees urged to vigilant enforcement by omnipresent liability. See generally
Banks, Indenture Securities and the Barkley Bill (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 533.
6. A good discussion of the security issue standards of the Act is contained in Meck
and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Management Under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of z935 (1938) 52 HAv. L. REv. 216, 217-221. A security issuer,
unless exempt under the terms of § 6(b), must secure a "license" to issue from the Com-
mission. To secure such license a prospective issuer must meet three sets of require-
ments. First, his issue must pass muster before applicable state laws. [§ 7(g)]. Second,
under § 7(c) (1) his security must be either a first lien bond or a par value voting com-
mon stock, (or a guaranty of another company's security or a receiver's certificate).
The purpose of this requirement is primarily to eliminate from financial structures the
ill-treated preferred stockholder and other hybrids whose risk is unreasonable. The im-
mediate effect of this bond-common stock dichotomy is largely dissipated, however, by
the exemption [§ 7(c) (2)] from its scope of issues for purposes of refunding or exchange,
or issues required for urgent corporate purposes. Operating companies gain still a fur-
ther exemption from the first lien bond-common stock requirement when the purpose of
the issue is to finance company business. As to operating companies, then, the force of
§ 7(c) probably is nugatory; holding companies, however, will tend gradually toward
the ideal structure.
All of these standards, however, are conditions precedent to § 7(d). Even if a security
complies with both state laws and § 7(c) it will fail to secure the acquiescence of the
Securities and Exchange Commission if that body finds adversely under § 7(d).
7. Hereinafter referred to as "Commission."
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structures are the provisions of Section 7(d). Under that section the Com-
mission is required to refuse approval to an issue when it finds that:
"(1) the security is not reasonably adapted to the security struc-
ture of the declarant and other companies in the same holding-
company system; or
"(2) the security is not reasonably adapted to the earning power
of the declarant; or
"(3) financing by the issue and sale of the particular security is
not necessary or appropriate to the economical and efficient operation
of a business in which the applicant lawfully is engaged or has an
interest; . . ."s
The words of subsections (1) and (2) appear clearly to provide the basis
for effective protection of investors by restrictions upon the evils of unbalanced
financial structures. The provisions are designed, apparently, to enable the
Commission to refuse an applicant permission to issue fixed obligations when
the proportion of fixed obligations outstanding to total capitalization is high
or when the company's earnings record is unstable. In the refunding cases
which have been the practically exclusive business thus far presented under
Section 7(d), 9 the Commission seems to have so interpreted subsections (1)
and (2). While the Commission has not refused an. applicant permission to
issue, in any reported refunding case, because of failure to conform to these
subsections, it has carefully analyzed the financial structure and earnings
record of the applicant to determine whether the proportion of debt to equity
investment has been high or whether the earnings did not amply cover the
fixed charges.10 Where not entirely satisfied with the results of its analysis,
rather than denying the right to issue, the Commission has imposed con-
ditions thereon, such as restrictions upon future dividend payments," as
terms of its approval.-2
The Commission's reluctance to bar the right to issue seems to be the
result of its view of the special problem presented in refunding cases.13 Since
8. 49 STAT. 815 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79g(d). (Supp. 1933).
9. Of the sparse "new"V money financing some has been exempted under § 6(b) from
the requirements of § 7. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co., Holding Company Act
Release No. 1670, Aug. 2, 1939.
10. In most of the cases the Commission merely states that the record indicates
that the issue complies with the provisions of § 7(d). Cases where the Commission has
discussed the standards of § 7(d) (1) and (2) in detail include: Public Service Co. of
Colo., Holding Company Act Release No. 1701, Aug. 24, 1939; pp. 30-34 [also § 7(d) (6)]
(but cf. Commissioner Healy dissenting at p. 61 ct scq.); and North. American Co.,
Holding Company Act Release No. 1427, Jan. 30, 1939, p. 24.
11. The dividend restrictions imposed by the Commission are discussed in Comment
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 492, 504 et seq.
12. Public Service Co. of Colo., Holding Company Act Release No. 1701, Aug. 24,
1939.
13. See the statement of Commissioner Healy, dissenting in Public Service Co. of
Colo., Holding Company Act Release No. 1701, Aug. 24, 1939, at 65: "Though under
the Act the same standards are applicable to refunding issues as to new issues, I Imow
that as a practical matter the standards are often relaxed in favor of refunding."
1940]
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in those cases unbalanced financial structures already exist, and since the
refinancing would tend to improve the structure by reducing fixed charges,
the Commission has contented itself with the imposition of conditions. Future
cases may present an even stronger reason for continued gentle treatment
of refundings; for when the bonds to be refunded have imminent maturities,
a denial of the right to sell refunding bonds might necessitate reorganization.
These special considerations, however, are not present when the purpose
of a security issue is not to refund but to raise "new" money. Cases in-
volving such new issues had been sparse and unenlightening until the advent
recently of the much-publicized Consumers Power case.1 4 Much of the
notoriety attending that case centers on the question raised tinder Section
7(d) (4) as to the reasonableness of the underwriters' fee and on the related
problem of the existence of arms-length bargaining between company and
banker.15 Far more significant, however, is the attitude taken by the Com-
mission toward the financial structure of the company and its right to issue
bonds. The Consumers Power Company, a financially sound operating utility
company within the jurisdiction of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
had earned and paid dividends on its common stock for years. It proposed to
raise $33,000,000- $29,500,000 by the sale of bonds at the unusually low
interest cost of 31,1 6 reflecting a strong credit rating, and $3,500,000 by the
sale of common stock lo its parent, which held all the outstanding common
stock. It was contemplated that the proceeds from the sale of the stock and
of $10,000,000 face value of the bonds would be used to finance new con-
struction; the balance of the proceeds of the sale of bonds to refund out-
standing bonds. The financial structure of the company consisted of 51%
14. Consumers Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1854, Dec. 28, 1939.
Public Service Co. of Colo., Holding Company Act Release No. 1701, Aug. 24, 1939,
the most enlightening case prior to the Consumers Power case, was partly a new issue
case. See note 30 infra.
15. The majority of the Commission held that there was no showing that the under-
writers' fees were unreasonable within the meaning of § 7(d) (4). Had the finding been
otherwise none of the bonds could have been issued. On this point the majority was com-
posed of Commissioners Frank, Healy and Mathews. Related to the matter of reason-
ableness of underwriters' fees was the possible absence of arms-length bargaining between
underwriters and issuer. Had such arms-length bargaining been absent no underwriters'
fee, with an unimportant exception, would be payable under the terms of § 12(f) and of
Rule U-12F-2, C. C. H. Secur. Act Service 8403A (1937). The underwriters, to
avoid delay in the marketing of the issue, agreed to surrender all fees if the Commission
made a later adverse finding. Accordingly, the Commission reserved judgment on this
point, Commissioners Henderson and Eicher dissenting.
Another issub presented by the case was the right of the parent, under the standards
of § 10, to acquire Consumers Power stock. The same majority held that the parent was
exempt from the requirements of that section by virtue of the terms of § 9(c) and of
Rule U-9C-3(14), C. C. H. Secur. Act. Service 8388B (1937). Commissioners Hen-
derson and Eicher argued otherwise, asserting that the Commission was not bound by its
rule. The rule has subsequently been amended. Holding Company Act Release No. 1890,
Jan. 20, 1940.
16. The face value of the bonds was $28,500,000; the rate 3%/49. The net proceeds




bonds, 29%o preferred stock and 20%o common stock and surplus; the ratio
of debt to net fixed assets was 55%o, and only 11% of the amount of net
fixed assets was available for common stock and surplus, after providing
fully for debt and preferred stock.
A minority of the Commission1 7 was not unduly troubled by this financial
structure; it felt that sufficient reason existed to grant permission to market
the entire issue. The proportion of debt to assets was 55%, and the Com-
mission, in other cases, had not stopped issues where far higher ratios
existed. The 20%o ratio of common stock and surplus to total capitalization,
furthermore, appeared to be misleading; another 29% of capitalization com-
prised preferred stock. Though the preferred stock interest might be larger
and the common stock interest smaller than was desirable, the disproportion
was not such as to affect the bonds or lead to reorganization. To the minority
these reasons justified a favorable finding under Section 7(d) (1); the un-
usually low rate of interest at which the bonds were to be sold also war-
ranted a finding that the transaction was "economical and efficient" within
the meaning of Section 7(d) (3).18
The majority' 9 of the Commission, however, speaking through Chairman
Frank, reacted differently. It considered the relation of the bond issue to
Section 7(d)20 twice, once for the bonds whose proceeds were to be used
for refunding, and once for the "new construction" bonds. Of the refunding
bonds the majority said, in line with the Commission's previous refunding
decisions, and in the absence of any adverse showing in the record,2 ' that
"the proposed issue . . . clearly meets the standards of Section 7(d) (1),
(2), (3) and (6)._"22 But the majority refused to permit the financing of
new construction by bond sales. They assumed, without deciding, that this
part of the issue met the terms of Section 7(d) (1) and (2). Their decision
was based on a resort, for the first significant time,2 to Section 7(d) (3),
under which the Commission cannot permit the issue of securities which it
finds are not "necessary or appropriate to the economical and efficient oper-
ation of a business." Interpreting the phrase "necessary or appropriate" to
mean that no other method of financing was "unquestionably better . . .
and . . . easily available," the majority found that the bonds did not meet
this standard. Common stock financing was regarded as "easily available,"
since the record established that at least one banker was willing to under-
write the sale of common stock and that the company had an excellent
17. On the issue of the $10,000,000 "new" bonds, the minority comprised Commis-
sioners Healy and Mfathews.
18. See the separate opinion of Commissioners Healy and 'athews, p. A-11 et seq.
19. On the issue of $10,000,000 "new" bonds the majority comprised Commission-
ers Frank, Henderson and Eicher.
20. All the securities proposed to be issued met the requirements of § 7(c). Chair-
man Frank's statement, Opinion, at 13, that the common stock satisfied the requirements
of § 7(c) (1) should instead, have referred to § 7(c) (2) (B), since the stock was no par.
Cf. the separate opinion of Commissioners Healy and 'Mathews, p. A-1.
21. See note 34 infra.
22. Chairman Frank's opinion, at 15.
23. Section 7(d) (3) had been applied once before in Northern States Power Co., 2
S. E. C. 825 (1937). See p. 751 infra.
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earnings and dividend record.2 4 Such financing was "unquestionably better"
because, although the company's bond structure had not approached the
danger point-to be tested under Section 7(d)(2) by available earnings
-heed had to be taken of the unpredictable future when the company, in
times of business stress, might require additional capital which could only
be secured "if the corporation has not previously exhausted its credit by the
issuance of bonds." Such additional capital, furthermore, when superim-
posed on the heightened debt-asset ratio resulting from the present financing,
might then necessitate an adverse finding by the Commission under Section
7(d) (1) .25 These general contingencies, when considered in conjunction
with the existing financial structure of the company- in the analysis of
which the majority categorized preferred stock with bonded debt - warranted
an adverse finding under Section 7(d) (3) .26
Whatever the merits of the Commission's decision, its reasoning alters its
previously expressed explanations of the respective purposes of subsections
(1), (2) and (3) of Section 7(d). It is true that all the members of the
Commission, despite their lack of unanimity on most of the issues in the
case, agreed on the interpretation to be assigned to Section 7(d) (3). Never-
theless, from the point of view of orthodox statutory interpretation, the
Commission's construction of the phrase "necessary or appropriate" included
in subsection (3) appears strained. The phrase appears at least thirty-five
times in varying contexts in the first twelve sections of the Act; moreover,
the Commission's construction is not necessarily reinforced by the broader
purpose of subsection (3). While the genesis of that subsection is obscure,
its conceivable objectives may differ from those assigned to it by the Com-
mission.2 7 It might have been designed to remedy a number of evils uncovered
by the Federal Trade Commission, such as the issue of securities by an
operating company when the funds raised were not to be used in the operation
of the business but for some extraneous purpose.2 8  Perhaps, also, it was
24. Chairman Frank's opinion, at 19.
25. Chairman Frank's opinion, at 26.
26. In view of the hasty and incomplete presentation of the case by the company, the
Commission's application of Section 7(d) (3) to the facts [and possibly its interpretation
of Section 7(d) (3)] may be revised upon more leisurely consideration. In an attempt to
meet the underwriters' "deadline" date applicants brought the case on for oral argument
before the evidence was fully heard. The Commission, therefore, has granted the parties
as a matter of right for ten days, a rehearing on the $10,000,000 "new" financing question
and agreed to reopen the record. This right was extended an additional ten days. Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 1876, Jan. 10, 1940.
27. Some support for the Commission's interpretation may be derived from the em-
phasis placed by § 7(d) (3) upon control of the "particular security".
28. See FED. TRADE CoMm. REPORT ON EcONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND CORPORATE
PHASES OF HOLDING AND OPERATING COMPANIES OF ELEcriC AND GAS UTILITIES, SEN.
Doc. No. 92, Pt. 72-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934) 358-9. Those pages disclosed the
prevalent practice of the sale of bonds bearing fixed charges by operating companies sole-
ly to provide funds for the benefit of parent holding companies unable to raise the funds
themselves and not for any legitimate operating need. The Holding Compxany Act was
largely based on this report; it was thus stated in § 1(b) of the Act. The Commission
has other means to control this evil; § 12(a) forbids upstream loans.
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aimed at sales of securities to raise unneeded funds. Prior to the Consumers
Pawer case, the Commission had not interpreted the subsection, except once
where an applicant sought to change the terms of an issue after marketing
to assist an underwriter to dispose of the issue.2 0 Since the company derived
no benefit from the change, and actually would have incurred out-of-pocket
expenses, the Commission held that subsection (3) barred the proposed
change. This case lends credence to the belief that the subsection might have
been designed to restrict the purposes for which financing might be under-
taken, rather than to place limitations upon a particular type of financing as
tending toward an unbalanced financial structure. The latter role appears
from the face of the statute to have been assigned to Section 7(d) (1) and
(2), a view of the statute which the Commission apparently had adopted in
the refunding cases.30
The Commission's reasons for relying on a novel interpretation of sub-
section (3), rather than upon a forthright application of subsections (1)
and (2) are an interesting subject for speculation. The choice may perhaps
be traced to the deliberate failure of Section 7(d) to distinguish between
refundings and new issues,3 ' and the desire of the Commission to continue
to treat refundings differently from new issues. In previous refunding cases,
the Commission had approved issues under subsection (1) in the face of
capital structures more unbalanced than that of Consumers Power.32 The
Commission may have hesitated to deny the Consumers Power application
under that subsection, lest by a denial of permission it should cast doubt
upon the soundness of its action in previous refunding cases, and thereby
render uncertain the status of future refunding cases. The Commission may
have thought that this difficulty would not be presented by an invocation of
subsection (3).. Under the majority's interpretation, the requirements of
this subsection would be satisfied when debt financing was the "necessary"
29. Northern States Power Co., 2 S. E. C 825 (1937).
30. See note 10 supra. This inference is particularly to be drawn from Public Ser-
vice Co. of Colorado, Holding Company Act Release No. 1701, Aug. 24, 1939. There a
small part of the issue was designed to raise new capital; the earning power was e.cep-
tionally strong. The Commission considered only §7(d)(1)(2) and (6), completely
ignoring the possibilities of § 7(d) (3).
31. The Holding Company Act, as introduced, expressly exempted refunding issues
from the provisions of § 7(d). Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on
S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 16, § 7(e); Hearings before Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 3, § 7(e).
When finally enacted, the provision relating to refunding issues was inserted instead as
a condition precedent to the application of § 7(d). While this change may conceivably
have been inadvertent, under orthodox canons of statutory interpretation, the change is
regarded as a deliberate manifestation of Congressional intent.
32. The most striking instance is Public Service Co. of Colo., Holding Company Act
Release No. 1701, Aug. 24, 1939. There the elimination of intercompany profits from
the asset accounts revealed that each $1 of original cost of assets supported $1.01 of debt.
Like Consumers Power, however, the earning power w%-as strong. This case is discussed
by Commissioners Healy and Mathews, pp. A-11-12. See Comment (1940) 49 YAJ.E L J.
492, 509; Central Illinois Gas & Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 1592,
June 19, 1939 (debt-asset ratio 107.8%).
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method in the sense that equity financing was not available. Since the typical
company seeking to refinance has no alternative but to refund by the sale of
bonds, Section 7(d) (3) would be inapplicable. 33 The Commission would
then be free to judge refunding cases in accord with the precedents set up
under subsections (1) and (2).
The Commission is, of course, justified in its attempt to treat refunding
bond issues differently from those designed to raise new capital. But although
the interpretation which it has placed upon subsection (3) will simplify the
Commission's administrative problem in most of the cases which arise,
annoying refunding-new issue problems will continue to present themselves.
One such situation embraces refunding bond cases which subsection (3)
would prohibit on the ground that common stock could be sold and bond
financing would be inappropriate when judged by the standards of the Con-
sumners Power case. Since most companies would not refund unless permitted
to do so with another bond issue, Commission disapproval would deprive
them of the refunding advantages which the Commission previously has been
so loathe to deny. Another problem would be presented when a bond issue
to raise new money is proposed which the Commission may feel it must
disapprove, despite the inapplicability of subsection (3) because common
stock financing is unavailable. Such an issue must then be judged under the
provisions of subsections (1) and (2). To approve the refunding issue under
subsection (3) or disapprove the new money issue under subsections (1)
and (2), the Commission would be compelled to decide that a different con-
clusion as to appropriateness [7(d) (3) 1 or reasonable adaptation to security
structure [7(d)(1)] and earning power [7(d)(2)] might well be reached
in the case of a refunding issue which cuts interest rates than would be reached
in the case of a new issue. If such a new issue-refunding dichotomy may
ultimately be required, the Commission might well have established it within
subsections (1) and (2) in the Consumers Power case, instead of delimiting,
as it did, the possible future scope of subsection (3).34
33. This conclusion is supported by the following statement of Chairman Frank:
"However, if we find that the security is 'necessary,' the security would satisfy the stan-
dards of § 7(d) (3) that it be 'necessary or appropriate,' and we would not reach the
question of whether it is appropriate. The clear language of the statute requires this
result and leaves no room for the contention that this interpretation is incongruous in that
a relatively weak company, because it is 'necessary' for it to sell the senior security, can
more easily satisfy the statutory standard than a strong company, which is able to finance
with alternative types of securities." Opinion of Chairman Frank, at 20.
34. Chairman Frank said that there was no showing that common stock financing
was available or bond financing inappropriate with respect to the $18,C00,000 refund-
ing bonds. Opinion, at 18-19. This, however, may have been the short solution to an
embarrassing problem. While the applicant, presumably, will resort to common stock
financing to furnish capital required for new construction, normally it would not desire
to sell common stock to refund bonds whose maturity is well-ahead. Had the Commis-
sion denied the right to refund by bond sales the declarant might have abandoned its
refunding program and sacrificed the hoped-for advantages. It should be noted that the
Commission has itself demonstrated that the present financial structure does not warrant
bond financing within the standards of § 7(d) (3). Furthermore, it is stated that Otis &
Co. had offered to market common stock of a minimum amount of $10,000,000. Opinion of
Chairman Frank, at 20.
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Irrespective of statutory niceties, the Commission's decision raises a serious
question as to the wisdom of the majority's analysis of the capital structure
of Consumers Power and poses some neat problems for prospective security
issuers. The Commission's decision in the Consumers Power case is not to
be construed as holding that, wherever possible, common stock financing
should be utilized; instead it indicates that equity financing, when possible,
will be required only when there is an unreasonable preponderance of securi-
ties other than common stock in the financial structure. The majority has
treated bonds and preferred stock alike in making this determination. The
existence of preferred stock in the financial structure, however, bears little
relation to the safety of that structure. Accumulated arrearages on preferred
shares cannot touch off reorganization processes, nor are managers under
any compulsion to pay preferred dividends which might impair the liquid
resources of the company. 35 If the majority had classified preferred stock
with the common, as did the minority, then the financial structure it would
have faced would have comprised some 51%, of outstanding bonds, instead
of 80% bonds and preferred stock. Whether the Commission's decision
would then have been different is unpredictable, but in view of the majority's
attitude toward preferred stock it is also academic.
Prospective issuers, however, must speculate how much lower must be
the ratio of bonds and preferred stock to total capitalization to avoid the
pitfalls of Section 7(d) (3). Uncertain, also, is the extent of the record
which the Commission will require before finding that common stock sales
are feasible. Future decisions may not be as simple as was that in Con-
sumers Power, where the testimony of an underwriter that he could sell such
stock stood uncontroverted. Not only will clannish underwriters hesitate
thus to aver, but issuers and their bankers may introduce contrary testimony.
The Commission may be obliged to rely on such external indicia as earning
power or available cash of a possible parent company. Should the Com-
mission's conclusion on the availability of common stock financing prove
erroneous, the operating program of the applicant might be seriously handi-
capped.
There can be no quarrel with the basic principle behind the Commission's
decision; a policy and practice which went further and required that all
financing be accomplished by common stock would be entirely defensible
from the sole standpoint of investor protection.30 It is to be hoped, however,
than in its eagerness to afford full protection to investors from the perils
of unbalanced capital structures, the Commission will not require unneces-
sary protection and thus create unwarranted obstacles to desirable utility
35. It is well settled that a debtor-creditor relationship is not created until the divi-
dend has been declared. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 921
(D. 'Aid. 1938). Directors have broad discretion as to the declaration of dividends.
BEasm AND MIEANS, THE MODE N CoPORwriToN AND PavrAT- Pno~rznr (1932) 1S9-9).
Though reorganization may not be forced by excessive preferred stock structure, however,
such structure may imperil credit and the ability to sell common stock.
36. On the desirability of greater common stock financing see FrnAi,, SAVE A'tnCx.A
FIRsT (1938) 385; foore, Railroad Fixed Chanres in BantrupcIy Proceedings (1939)
47 J. POL. Ecox. 100, 107-15.
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expansion or construction programs. Whether the Commission has under-
protected or overguarded the investors in Consumers Power is to be tested
solely by the future experience of investors in that company. It has been
suggested that the principles of regulation enunciated in the Holding Company
Act, if successful there, will become a pattern for Governmental action in
other fields of investment.3 7 Judgment as to the wisdom of such enlarged
legislation awaits more extensive experience in the limited field regulated
by the Public Utility Holding Company Act.
LIABILITY OF UNION TO EMPLOYEES DISCHARGED AS RESULT OF
CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENT*
WHILE tort liability is conceded to follow intentional interference with an
existing contract or employment relation in the absence of sufficient "justifi-
cation" for such interference,' the attitude of courts has widely varied in
applying this indeterminate rule to litigation arising from an attempt by a
labor union to secure a closed shop.2 Although there have been comparatively
few cases in which suit was brought by an employee who had been discharged
as a consequence of a closed shop agreement, the related issue of the remedies
available to an employer in his resistance to the union's demand frequently
rests on judicial speculation as to the effect of the closed shop on the welfare
of the non-union employee.3 Assuming without inquiry that other work is
37. Commissioner Frank, dissenting in North American Co., Holding Company Act
Release No. 1427, Jan. 30, 1939, at 30.
* Dorrington et al. v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939).
1. For a thorough discussion of the rule and its history, see Carpenter, Interference
with Contract Relations (1928) 41 HARV. L. R.v. 728. The Restatement of Torts pro-
vides: ". . . One who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely caus-
es a third person not to (a) perform a contract with another, or (b) enter into or con-
tinue a business relation with another is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby."
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 766. Also, see § 810, set forth at note 12 infra. Actual
malice is not essential to the cause of action; the absence of lawful excuse or justification
is enough. Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923). If malice can be
proved, punitive damages may be allowed. Kinane v. Fay, 111 N. J. L. 553, 168 AtI. 724
(Sup. Ct. 1933).
2. For a general discussion of the decisions, see Magruder, A Half Century of Legal
Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining (1937) 50 HARV. L. Rav.
1071; Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 195;
Despres, The Collective Agreement Foe' the Union Shop (1939) 7 U. OF Cnm. L. REV. 24.
3. Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479 (1920); Inter-
national Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, 122 N. J. Eq. 222, 193 Atl. 808 (Ch. 1937) ; Cooks',
Waiters' and Waitresses' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S. W. 1086 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921). In a recent case, the defendants were convicted of a criminal conspiracy under a
Maine statute, for agreeing to conduct a strike for a closed shop, State v. Mackey, 135
Me. 488, 200 AtI. 511 (1938), appeal dismissed, 305 U. S. 570 (1938) (want of "a prop-
erly presented substantial federal question"), rehearing denied, 305 U. S. 675 (1938),
87 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 485.
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unavailable and that the employees of a particular plant are necessarily
antagonistic to unionism, many courts in the past have declared that picket-
ing, boycotts and strikes are unlawful when directed towards securing an
agreement with an employer to retain or hire only union men. These activities
have been disapproved as interferences with the "liberty" of the individual,
imposing the "unwarranted" condition that he join a union in order to pursue
his vocation. 4 But an increasing number of courts are now willing to recog-
rize that an attempt by a union to obtain a closed shop contract may be
justified as a legitimate method of enlarging union membership and strength-
ening the bargaining power of organized laborr Union activity to secure
a closed shop agreement may be justified even when another union already
has such a contract, since its existence does not necessarily insure that the
workers are adequately represented by an efficient collective agency.6
Some courts have been content to condemn closed shop agreements on
the theory that such contracts "tend" to promote a monopoly of the labor
market by excluding from employment all those who do not belong to the
union. 7 In other decisions, a distinction has been drawn between an attempt
to secure a closed shop in a single factory or in a small group of factories
and an attempt to secure the closed shop in substantially an entire industry
in a particular area.8 This distinction is unsatisfactory and has received
4. See cases cited supra note 3. The statement of the court in Cooks', Waiters' and
Waitress' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S. IA. 1036, 1088, 1039 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)
is typical: "The Constitution grants to every man, under the protection of the American
flag, the right to make contracts for his personal services, free from hindrance or ob-
struction by his fellow men, and he has the inalienable right to freely use his hands for
whom he pleases, upon such terms as he pleases."
5. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkdn, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927);
Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547 (1938), appeal dismissed, 303 U. S.
621 (1938); Four Plating Co. v. 'Mako, 122 N. J. Eq. 298, 194 At!. 53 (Ch. 1937). In
M & M Wood Working Co. v. Plywood & Veneer %V. L. U. No. 102, 23 F. Supp. 11, 18
(D. Ore. 1938), the court said: "This type of agreement is sanctioned by the historical
development of the labor movement as one of the most valuable guarantees of economic
freedom of the workingman. The decisions of the courts recognize this fact."
6. Stillwell v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932), discussed with approval
in Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes in Search of a Forum (1940) 49 YALE L J. 424, 459.
Stillwell v. Kaplan is not the prevailing view, however. See Despres, supra note 2, at 44.
For the effect of the Labor Relations Acts on the closed shop, see ibid.; Abelow, The
Closed Shop in New York (1938) 7 BROOKLYN L. Rm'. 459, 476, 477; Comment (1933)
38 CoL L. R~v. 1243, 1247. As to union liability for inducing the breach of a "yellow
dog" contract, see Comment (1938) 32 ILL. L. Rsv. 611, 617.
7. Berry v. Donovan, 183 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603 (1905) ; Curran v. Galen, 152
N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297 (1897). "Public policy and the interests of society favor the ut-
most freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and if the purpose of an
organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper, or to restrict, that freedom
... , then that purpose seems clearly unlawful and militates against the spirit of our gov-
ernment and the nature of our institutions .... " Id. at 37, 46 N. E. at 298. For the
present New York rule, see note 13 infra.
8. Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 At!. 600 (1913); Four Plating Co. v.
Mlako, 122 N. J. Eq. 298, 194 At. 53 (Ch. 1937); Canter Sample Furniture House v.
Retail Furniture Emp. Local, 122 N. J. Eq. 575, 196 At!. 210 (Ch. 1937); Upholsterers'
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confused application in the cases. One court refused to enforce a closed shop
contract in a district in which sixty-five per cent of the employers in an
industry had such contracts.0 In the same jurisdiction, although nearly fifty
per cent of an industry had such agreements, a strike for a closed shop was
sanctioned. 10 The criterion of the proportion of the industry covered by
closed shop contracts allows too much latitude to an unsympathetic court
to make a finding of "intent" to monopolize. Flimsy evidence has sustained
the conclusion that a strike in question was "part and parcel of an attempt
to unionize the entire . . . industry" in a city, the court stating that it
was impossible to consider the attempt to unionize a single shop or place
of business in "isolation from the wave of strikes and labor controversies
sweeping the country . -
The test of union liability for enforcing a closed shop agreement, which
few cases have recognized but which seems most consistent with the pro-
motion of the interests of labor as a whole and the protection of the individual
worker, is whether admission to the union is permitted to existing employees
on reasonable terms.' 2 Public policy should not be concerned with the extent
of the closed shop agreement, for if adequate provision is made for the pro-
C. & L. M. I. Union v. Essex Reed & Fibre Co., 12 N. J. Misc. 637, 174 Atl. 207 (Ch.
1934) ; Polk v. Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E. 808 (1935).
9. Upholsterers', C. & L. M. I. Union v. Essex Reed & Fibre Co., 12 N. J. Misc.
637, 174 Atl. 207 (Ch. 1934).
10. Four Plating Co. v. Mako, 122 N. 3. Eq. 298, 194 At. 53 (Ch. 1937).
11. Canter Sample Furniture House v. Retail Furniture Employees Local, 122 N. J.
Eq. 575, 592, 196 At. 210, 218 (Ch. 1937). The court stressed the fact that another retail
furniture dealer had filed a similar bill of complaint against the union.
Another unsatisfactory distinction sometimes made in the decisions is that if the "pri-
mary aim" of the union was to injure or exclude from their work men who are not mem-
bers of the labor organization, its action is unlawful, whereas if its object is "merely" to
procure work for those who are members, injury to the non-union workman being "inci-
dental," it will not be liable for inducing the breach of the employment contract. Ob-
viously, in nearly every case, the motive which must meet the test of justification is nearly
the same: to insure that all the workmen in the particular shop will be union men. See
Despres, .rupra note 2, at 36.
12. The Restatement of Torts provides: "Workers who in concert procure the dis-
missal of an employee because he is not a member of a labor union satisfactory to the
workers are . . . liable to the employee if, but only if, he desires to be a member
of the labor union but membership is not open to him on reasonable terms." REsTATE-
MENT, TORTS (1939) § 810. Cf. id. § 788. See Witmer, supra note 2, at 219. In Fracn-
kel, One Hundred and Fifty Years of the Bill of Rights (1939) 23 MiNN. L. REv. 719,
767, it is said: "Clear it is that if closed shop agreements are to be recognized, the union
must admit all qualified persons to membership." Courts have been favorably influenced
in their decisions by the willingness of the union to take in men affected by the closed
shop contract. See Shinskey v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 104, 121 N. E. 790, 792 (1919);
Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 613, 91 N. Y. Supp. 185, 190 (2d Dep't
1904). In two states where an attempt by a union to secure a closed shop has been
otherwise upheld, the union has been liable to discharged workers whom they unreason-
ably refused to admit to the union. Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123
N. J. Eq. 347, 197 AtI. 720 (Ch. 1938), 23 MINN. L. Rav. 236; Dorrington et al. v.
Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939).
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tection'of the employees it affects, such a "monopoly of the labor market"
is beneficial, rather than harmful.' 3 Actually, the purpose of the dosed shop
contract is almost always to induce employees to join the union rather than
to place other men in their jobs.14 The concessions secured from an employer
by union activity redound to the benefit of all workers in his plant. It is
accordingly not unreasonable to demand that they become members and
contribute to the support of the union.'6 Since improved working conditions
cannot ordinarily be maintained in but part of a competitive industry, the
union is justified in its attempt to unionize every factory in a particular
trade. 6
On the other hand, if admission to the union is unreasonably denied to
one who is thereafter discharged in consequence of a dosed shop agreement,
the union should be held liable regardless of whether the dosed shop agree-
ment is made with a single employer or with a group, in a small or large
part of an industry.' 7 Such, in effect, was the holding of a recent Pennsyl-
vania case, in which .the court stated that the conduct of the defendant union
in coercing the employer to discharge the plaintiffs, who had been arbitrarily
refused admission to the association, "constituted a malicious and wilful
interference with plaintiffs' contract of employment and a conspiracy to do
an unlawful act." '' The plaintiffs were awarded damages for loss of wages
13. Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547 (1938), appcal dismisscd, 303
U. S. 621 (1938) (dosed shop contract between the New York rapid Transit Corpora-
tion with the Transport Workers' Union). See Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v.
Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130, 132 (1927). In Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207,
211, 76 N. E. 5, 7 (1905), the court said: "To coerce workmen to become members of
the employees organization through such a contract, is not the allegation of something
which the law will, necessarily, regard as contravening public policy." Cf. test in Rz-
sTATESmmrE, CoNTRAcrs (1932) § 515, Illus. 19.
14. The agreements frequently provide that they are to operate only prospectively
or that all employes will be admitted to the union. See L anuAx,, Tun CoLtxervz
LABoR AGaREE Tr (1939) 202; Polk v. Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E. 803
(1925); Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d Dep't
1904).
15. If the employee were able to secure the benefits of the union vthout the burden,
members would tend to drop out and the organization would become ineffective. This
argument has been used by Brandeis. See FRAENxxxr, THE CURsE OF BIGxrss (1934) 93
et seq.
16. "All engaged in a trade are affected by the prevailing rate of wages. All, by the
principle of collective bargaining. Economic organization today is not based on the single
shop. Unions believe that wages may be increased, collective bargaining maintained only
if union conditions prevail, not in some single factory but generally. That they may pre-
vail it may call a strike and picket the premises of an employer with the intent of induc-
ing him to employ only union labor." Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245
N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130, 132 (1927). See American Foundries v. Tri-City Council,
257 U. S. 184, 209 (1921); Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 10, 11, 12 N. . (2d) 547,
550, 551 (1938).
17. See note 12 supra.
18. Dorrington et al. v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 199, 4 A. (2d) 896, 839 (1939).
The union gave no reason for excluding plaintiffs from membership. The court incidentally
approved the finding below that the collective bargaining agreement was executed on the
understanding that all edsting employees would be admitted to membership in the union.
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and an injunction restraining defendants from interfering with their "resump-
tion of employment. The justification which ordinarily exists for a union's
interference with established employment relations, in its demand for a closed
shop, is obviously lacking in a case like the one in question, when the object
of the action is not to strengthen collective bargaining, but simply to promote
the interests of a particular group to the detriment of a disfavored few.
In issuing an injunction, which seems to be an appropriate remedy in this
case, 19 the court necessarily rejected the argument that the anti-injunction
statutes 20 were applicable. It is true that these statutes expressly cover a
dispute in which the parties are not in the proximate relation of employer
and employee, but they are inapplicable altogether except to "labor disputes"
or controversies concerning "terms or conditions of employment." The instant
case involved a private dispute which was in no way connected with the
respective interests of employer and employee, terms or conditions of em-
ployment or the question of the proper employees' bargaining agency.
21
The union would, of course, have a defense in the worker's opportunity
to mitigate damages, if they could prove that it was possible for him to find
equivalent employment at a reasonable distance from his home.2 2 The union
should also have the priiilege of demanding that the worker properly qualify
as a member.23 This privilege, however, should not relieve the union of
liability for securing the dismissal of a worker, if he has been denied entrance
into the union as a result of an unreasonable test or restriction. 24 Moreover,
union liability should not be affected by the circumstance that the employment
19. A similar remedy was granted in Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union,
123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (Ch. 1938). The plaintiffs have been guilty of no mis-
conduct, the issuance of an injunction will involve relatively little hardship to the defend-
ants, and a multiplicity of suits will be avoided thereby.
20. For a discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and similar state acts, see Com-
ment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 537; (1938) 23 CORN. L. Q. 339; (1939) 25 VA. L. R.v. 719.
21. It is important, of course, that these statutes be liberally construed by the courts
to protect the rights of labor. The present case, however, amounts to no more than a fight
among individuals to secure certain employment. The case is analogous to La Rose v.
Possehl, 156 Misc. 476, 282 N. Y. Supp. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1935), in which the court held
that a dispute between a union and the plaintiff as to whether he was entitled to be recog-
nized as a member was not a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the term in the statute.
The court was influenced by the fact that under the statutory provision it was necessary
to post a bond of $10,000 as a prerequisite of obtaining a temporary injunction in a "labor
dispute."
22. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1939) § 918, comment f. Cf. Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc.
609, 48 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct., 1897); Local Union No. 65 v. Nalty, 7 F. (2d) 100
(C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
23. The courts have indicated that the union may validly require its applicants to
attain to certain technical standards. Clemmitt v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38, 42, 42 N. E.
367, 368 (1895) ; National Protective Ass'n v. Cummings, 170 N. Y. 315, 323, 63 N. E.
369, 370 (1902). The union is also privileged to procure the dismissal of a worker who
has been justly expelled from the union. Harmon v. United Mine Workers, 166 Ark. 255,
266 S. W. 84 (1924) ; Roddy v. United Mine Workers, 41 Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126 (1914).
Contra: Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913).
24. The courts would probably condemn an unreasonably high or unequal initiation
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was at wil, 23 although some courts have stated that in such a case no action
will lie unless the method of interference itself was tortious. -06 The mere fact
that the employer has the privilege of terminating such employment for any
cause whatsoever does not carry the implication that the employee should
be unprotected against a third party who unjustifiably influences the employer
in his exercise of privilege.27 If the employee is a competent workman who
is willing to become a member, the union rarely can justify its interference
with his employment relations.28
When no existing employment relation is disturbed, but a worker cannot
find a job because the union arbitrarily refuses to admit him to member-
ship, the courts have been slow to protect the interests of the non-union
man.2 9 Although a remedy is available to a member who has been wrong-
fully expelled,30 a writ of mandamus will not issue to compel a voluntary
association to admit an applicant to membership.3t Thus the worker cannot
by suit directly force his way into the organization, but possibly by means
of an indirect sanction, the union may be constrained to allow him to join
or to have its closed shop program partially defeated.32 The courts should
25. See Carpenter, supra note 2, at 763; Despres, supra note 2, at 34; REsrwTEMENr,
ToRTs (1939) § 810, quoted supra note 12.
26. "There can be no damages resulting to an employee on account of a discharge
from an employment at will." Harmon v. United Mine Workers, 166 Ark. 255, 258, 245
S. XV. 84, 85 (1924).
27. Railray Conductors v. Jones, 78 Col. 80, 239 Pac. 832 (1925) ; Lucke v. Cloth-
ing Cutters, 77 Md. 396, 26 At. 505 (1893).
28. Proof of hostility to union purposes would probably be considered the only
grounds of justification. Evidence of a previous refusal to join the union has been con-
sidered insufficient reason to deny membership to an applicant and to procure his dis-
missal from his employment. Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 235
(1939).
29. Underwood v. Te.xas & P. Ry., 178 S. W. 38 (Tem. Civ. App. 1915). Even when
it is shown that the association has a monopoly of work in a given area, the cases seem to
turn on whether the plaintiff was dismissed or merely could not find employment because
of a closed shop agreement. Witmer, su, ra note 2, at 213, 214.
30. See discussion in Jaffe, supra note 6, at 445.
31. Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n, 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 At. 492 (Ch.
1890); Legis. (1940) 53 Hav. L. REv. 500, 501. The court in 'Mayer v. Journeymen
Stonecutters' Ass'n, 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 524, 20 At. 492, 494 (Ch. 1890), stated: "The
very idea of such organizations is association mutually acceptable . . . a power to require
the admission of persons in any way objectionable to the society is repugnant to the
scheme of its organization."
32. The courts in both Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq.
347, 197 At. 720 (Ch. 1938) and Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 Ak. (2d)
886 (1939) allowed damages and an injunction against unions which unreasonably refused
to admit to membership workers who had been discharged as a consequence of a closed
shop agreement. The Wilson case applied the analogy of a common carrier whoe duty
to serve all comers on reasonable terms is imposed because of the monopoly it possesses.
The court stated: "A union may restrict its membership at pleasure; it may, under cer-
tain conditions, lawfully contract with employers that all work shall be given to its mem-
bers. But it cannot do both." 123 N. 3. Eq. 347, 351, 197 At. 720, 722. The same ra-
tionale may be used for the protection of a worker who has been refused a particular job
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hold that a good cause of action is stated, if it is alleged that the plaintiff
definitely would have been able to secure a job with a particular employer,
had he been admitted to a union which arbitrarily rejected his application
for membership. A worker's reasonable expectation of employment may well
be considered a sufficient interest to be protected against unjustifiable inter-
ference by third parties. 3 In such a situation, if a non-union employee is
hired, he should not be held liable for inducing the employer to breach his
closed shop agreement, since enforcement of the contract when union member-
ship is not freely available contravenes public policy in that it unduly restricts
the employment opportunities of non-union men without benefitting labor
as a class.34
It may be necessary in the future to utilize an administrative agency to
protect the non-union man who cannot procure a job because he is arbi-
trarily excluded from a union; unemployed, he probably cannot bear the
expense of litigation. Recent statutes in two states have helped to insure
that all employees affected by a closed shop agreement will be admitted to
union membership, 8 but no state has taken upon itself the regulation of
union admissions.3 6 It is clear, however, that the danger of abuse of mono-
polistic power on the part of unions is small. In most industries, their
positions are insecure, and even when they exercise control over a large
industry, their policies of admission are liberal.3 7 If the danger arises, it
can easily be met, but the doubtful possibility of future abuse of power on
the part of unions should not be regarded as a sufficient defense for ob-
structing the growth of the closed shop.
for no other reason than his lack of membership in a union which has a monopoly of
work in a particular district and unreasonably denies him admission to its organization.
33. The chapter of the Restatement of Torts dealing with labor disputes has no rule
for this situation, but the general principle set forth in § 766, cited supra note 1, seems to
cover such a case.
34. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 513; RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1939) § 774;
see Illustration (1) in § 18 of Proposed Final Draft No. 6 (1939).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 43, § 211.6(1) (c) (June 1939) ; Wis.
Laws 1939, c. 57. Both statutes are amendments to the respective state labor relations
acts and are designed for the protection of employees affected by a closed shop contract.
The Pennsylvania statute fails to allow a union to deny membership to a man for good
cause, but otherwise these enactments are commendable as consistent with the best interests
of the individual and of the union. Cf. Legis. (1940) 53 HAMv. L. Rv. 500.
36. Attempts have been made to prevent racial and religious discrimination on the
part of unions. Comment (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 986, 995, 996. State regulation of union
admissions is clearly ill-advised and should not be attempted in the absence of serious
abuses of widespread consequence.
37. See Despres, supra note 2, at 29, 30.
[Vol. 49760
NOTES
COOPERATIVE BUYING OF GASOLINE AS SHERMAN ACT
VIOLATION *
"CooPERATioN" and an allied group of catchwords have loomed large in
the recent vocabulary of the oil industry. "Cooperation" has been the means
for cutting down the supply of petroleum through "conservation," for avoid-
ance of "economic waste" through allocation of production, for assuring a
fair return to the industry through "stabilization," for sharing technical ad-
vantages among eligible members of the industry, and for eliminating "cut-
throat competition" through mutual respect for marketing territories and
existing price levels.' An overdose of "cooperation" has occasionally brought
the industry into conflict with the anti-trust laws.2 A prosecution under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act,3 now pending before the United States Supreme
Court, questions the propriety of "cooperation" in eliminating a "competitive
abuse." 4
Defendants in the case are a dozen "majors" or "integrated oil companies,"
so called because of their economic pre-eminence in the industry and because
their enterprise encompasses all stages of the business from drilling oil wells
to wiping windshields. In 1935 they were asked by the Petroleum Adminis-
tration of the NRA to assist in stabilizing retail gasoline markets in a ten-
state midwestern area in which the major companies manufactured and dis-
tributed more than 85% of all the gasoline sold.5  Chief cause of low retail
prices was the presence of so-called "surplus" gasoline: that part of the
production of independent non-integrated refiners in the oil fields for which
they had no ready customers and which they were obliged to sell for what
it would bring. In an attempt to dry up this supply at its source, defendants
extended their stabilization activities to the refineries by means of concerted
programs for keeping "surplus" off the market. Field investigators determined
which refineries had "surplus" on their hands. A major company was then
assigned to "dance" with each independent - to buy up all the excess gasoline
RUnited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939),
cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct 124 (U. S. 1939).
1. See WATKINS, OIL: STABrIZATION oR CoNsERVATiON? (1937) 43-45; Marshall
and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration (1933)
42 YA.LE L. J. 702, 708, n. 19, 711; ICEmNTZER, REIrrH OF MoNooLY (1938) 172-78;
2 REP. NAT. REcOvERY REv. BoA-D (1934) 54-56.
2. Ohio v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. E. 279 (1S92) ; United States v.
Standard, Oil Co., 148 Fed. 719 (N. D. Ill. 1907) ; Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United
States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., Tim FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS (1938) 240 (consent decree); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of
N. J., 47 F. (2d) 288 (E. D. Mo. 1931); Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283
U. S. 163 (1931) ; Texas v. Standard Oil Co. (Petition filed in District Court of Trav.is
County, Texas, April 15, 1932); United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 27 F. Supp. 959
(S. D. N. Y. 1939), 48 YAL L. J. 1089.
3. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
4. 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), cert. granted, 60 Sup. Ct. 124 (U. S. 1939).
5. Record on appeal, pp. 186-8, 1796-7, 3487, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil
Co., 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
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refined by its "dancing partner." 6 The significance of this cooperative venture
lay in the peculiar price customs of the area. Although less than 10% of
the gasoline distributed in the area originated in the "spot market" (not an
organized exchange but the composite of current transactions at oil field
refineries), all gasoline prices in the area depended upon the spot market
price as reported in trade journals. Retail and tank-wagon prices were ad-
justed by the area's market leader, Standard Oil of Indiana, to preserve a
fixed margin over the reported spot market price, and some 40% of the
gasoline sold in the area by the majors was purchased by independent jobbers
on long-term contracts which uniformly provided that the price to be paid
for each shipment of gasoline was to be determined by the spot market price
at the date of each purchase. 7 By absorbing a small amount of gasoline and
thereby buoying up the spot market price, the defendant major companies
were able to prevent the dropping of prices to competitive levels throughout
the industry. That the companies acted in concert and that the programs
affected price levels was not denied. Defendants were found guilty of com-
bining in restraint of trade, under a charge by the trial judge that, if the
defendants had the power to raise gasoline prices and combined for that pur-
pose, their conduct was in itself unlawful. The charge accorded with the
government's presentation of the case along the lines of United States v.
Trenton Potteries Company8 which held that a combination by 82% of an
industry to fix prices was per se an illegal restraint of trade tinder the
Sherman Act.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on
the ground that the jury should have been permitted to consider the defenses
invoked by the majors in extenuation of their conduct.0 The defendants
claimed that "surplus" gasoline was a recognized "competitive abuse," an
unnatural depressant of the market whose elimination would restore true
competitive conditions and excuse any incidental effects upon price levels. 10
The majors relied heavily upon Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,"
which had permitted cooperative marketing of "distress coal," a misfit by-
product whose unsalability had contributed to the troubled state of the coal
industry. This case, they claimed, modified Trenton Potteries to permit
6. Record on appeal, pp. 369-442, 1166-1208, 1689-1706. The "dancing partner" sys-
tem was employed only in the mid-continent oilfield but comparable purchases from in-
dependent refiners were carried on simultaneously in the East Texas field; id. at 567-594,
623-670.
7. Id. at 189, 244, 797-99, 1004-05 (spot market) ; id. at 251, 290, 1233-35 (fixed
margin prices);'id. at 999-1000, 3031-42 (jobber contracts). Defendant Sinclair Refitn-
ing Co. did not base jobber contracts upon the spot market price; id. at 340, The prac-
tice of basing other prices upon the spot market price long antedated the present com-
bination. See F. T. C., PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, PRICES, PROFITS AND COMPETITION (1928)
214-218; BURNS, THE DFCLINE OF COMPETITION (1936) 97.
8. 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
9. See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 809, 827 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939).
10. Brief of Defendants-Appellants, pp. 150-3, 167-170, United States v. Socony
Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
11. 288 U. S. 344 (1933).
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combinations to affect prices incidentally in the cause of eliminating a "com-
petitive abuse." Trenton Potteries and its predecessor cases were distinguished
as forbidding price-fixing but not "stabilization," and as proscribing only
compulsory combinations of those groups which, through control of an essen-
tial portion of a product, have the power to eliminate competition." De-
fendants also claimed that in removing "surplus" from the market, the majors
were implementing a Governmental policy of raising gasoline prices to restore
them to a profitable relationship with the price of crude oil fixed by the
Petroleum Administration. They showed, in support of this, that minor
officials of the Petroleum Administration knew and tacitly approved of the
buying programs, and acquiesced in their continuance after the collapse of
NRA.'3 Although they claimed no exemption from the anti-trust laws, the
majors bitterly protested the unfairness of being prosecuted for participating
in activities originally sponsored by the Government.
If the defendants' disclaimers of any intent to profiteer, their protests that
their only motive in conducting the buying programs was that of cooperating
with NRA in "bailing out" the independent refiner, and their glib character-
ization of surplus gasoline as a "competitive abuse" be taken at face value,
as apparently the circuit court took them, the oil companies appear in the
martyred light of being prosecuted for their patriotic efforts in aid of a
national recovery program. Fairmindedness, it then seems, calls for rejecting
the categorical approach of Trenton Potteries in favor of a "rule of reason"
which would permit the jury to consider all these ameliorating factors. An
examination of the defendants' activities in the light of the structure and
recent competitive history of the oil industry, however, presents the programs
in a somewhat broader perspective than that adopted by the circuit court.
Among industries, oil is unique in being highly competitive at its pro-
duction and distribution ends but almost devoid of price competition in its
intermediate stages of refining and pipe line transportation, where the score
or so of major companies are securely entrenched.' 4 Through their control
of 83.8% of refining production, 89% of crude oil trunk pipe line mileage
and 96% of gasoline pipe line mileage,"1 and their monopolies of the Ethyl
and cracking process patents,'16 the majors are able to exact toll from the
vast proportion of the nation's oil which, almost inevitably, must pass through
their hands at some stage in its journey from some 350,000 oil wells to an
12. Brief of Defendants-Appellants, 129-31, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil
Co., 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) ; id. at 822-23. The "compulsory combination"
argument was raised gratuitously by the court; id. at 821.
13. Brief of Defendants-Appellants, 30-35, 199-217, United States v. Socony Vacuum
Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Record on appeal, pp. 1263-1337, 1729-34.
14. WATKIS, OIL: STABILIZATION OR CONSERVxTION? (1937) 21-29; see N.ATIO*.AL
BuREAu OF EcOxOmIc RESEARcH, PRICE RESEARCH IN THE STEEL AND PSr OLEVt I -
DUSTRIES (1939) 93.
15. 6 TNEC, VERBATIM RECORD OF PRocEEoINGs (1939) 4, 87-97.
16. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 33 F. (2d) 617, 619-30 (N. D.
Ill. 1929), rcv'd, 283 U. S. 163 (1931); United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 27 F.
Supp. 959, 961 (S. D. N. Y. 1939), 48 YALE L. J. 1089; N. Y. LEist TurE, Rmi oro
JOINT CoMn-M'a ON GASOLIYE (Legis. Doe. No. 90, 1937) 29; KFnnznn, R Mrr-
OF MONOPOLY (1938) 172-78.
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almost equal number of service stations.17  Heavy profits from pipe line
operation have been used to subsidize expansion into the production and
marketing fields18 to make the majors dominant factors in all parts of the
industry. Through their control of two thirds of the industry's wealth, their
huge volume of purchases and sales and their leadership in the industry's
trade association and propaganda activities,'0 the majors are virtually able
to speak for the industry itself. Although nominally rivals, the integrated
companies have been drawn into unified activity- partly through common
or similar origin, partly through interlocking ownership and affiliates, 20 but
principally through the community of interest which arises among large in-
dustrial units when each respects the power of each of his competitors over
the market and appreciates the devastating consequences of earnest price
competition between such huge companies. 21 As a result, instead of price
competition, there is between the major companies a "follow the leader"
policy whereby all major company prices- the purchase price for crude oil,
pipe line tariffs, tank-car, tank-wagon and retail gasoline prices-follow
exactly the price policy of a market leader, which almost invariably is the
local Standard Oil Company.22 Any competition that exists is on a super-
ficial non-price level- directed toward advertising and lavishness of market-
ing equipment rather than toward public benefit from lowered prices.23
17. See 6 TNEC, VERBATIM RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (1939) 88, 626; NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, PRICE RESEARCH IN THE STEEL AND PETROLEUM INDUS-
TRIES (1939) 90-91.
18. 6 TNEC, VERBATIM RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (1939) 216; Hearings before Sub-
committee No. 3, Judiciary Committee, on H. R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 6-7,
99; WATKINS, OIL: STABILIZATION OR CONSERVATION? (1937) 248. Jobbers regarded
the buying programs as an additional weapon in a campaign to oust them from the indus-
try. See PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD, FINAL REPORT OF THE MARKETING Divi-
SION (1936) 21, 22, 80; MICH. SEN. J., (Regular Sess. 1937) 49, 50; NATIONAL OIL MAR-
KETERs ASSOCIATION, THE MICHIGAN AND WISCONSIN INVESTIGATIONS OF OIL MARKET-
ING (1935) 8, 10.
19. 6 TNEC, VEmATIM RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (1939) 4, 242-44; 2 REP. NAT.
RECOVERY REV. BOARD (1934) 51; N. Y. LEGISLATURE, REPORT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON
GASOLINE (Legis. Doc. No. 90, 1937) 28; KEMNITzER, REBIRTH OF MONOPOLY (1938)
23-28.
20. F. T. C., PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, PRICES, PROFITS AND COMPETITION (1928)
63-81; 6 TNEC, VERBATIM RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (1939) 87, 275-278; KEMNITZER,
REBIRTH OF MONOPOLY (1938) 42, 43.
21. See Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, Judiciary Committee, on H. R. ,318,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 95; CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETI-
TION (1933) 230-255; Fly, Observations on the Anti-trust Laws (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
1339, 1341-43; Cohen, The Anti-trust Acts and "Monopolistic Competition" (1938) 24
CORN. L. Q. 80, 81; Richberg, The Monopoly Issue (1939) 87 U. oF PA. L. REV. 375,
378.
22. See 6 TNEC, VERBATIM RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (1939) 206-07, 655-57; Hear-
ings before Subcommittee No. 3, Judiciary Committee, on H. R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1939) 125, 157, 288-92; 2 REP. NAT. RECOVERY REV. BOARD (1934) 54; BURNS,
THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936) 93-109; CURTIS, THE TRUSTS AND ECONOMIC
CONTROL (1931) 346.
23. See 2 REP. NAT. RECOVERY REV. BOARD (1934) 55.
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Although oil refining and transportation have been featured by monopolistic
practices since their infancy,24 it was only when the majors' oil inventories,
greatly expanded in the belief that America's underground resources soon
would be depleted,25 were imperilled by the discovery of unexpected large
oil fields by independent operators in 1926 and 193020 that the credo of
monopolism, the preservation of price levels by cutting down supply, became
the industry's gospel. The religion of "cooperation" made its appearance with
appeals to drillers to curtail production.2-7 When these failed, the respectable
elements in the industry turned to the states with pious urgings of the need
for "conservation" of underground resources.28 The emotional content of
the word "conservation" evoked great public sympathy, although the argu-
ments supporting the principle were based upon frequently disproved geo-
logical evidence.29 That the industry's interests were not wholly that of
preserving the national oil supply is shown by its concurrent lobby for a
protective tariff against imports of foreign oil.30 The economic motives that
lay behind "conservation" became apparent in 1931 when martial law was
invoked in Texas and Oklahoma to shut down production until the price of
crude oil rose from 20 cents to $1 per barrel. 3' The emphasis upon price was
explained by the statement that curbing "economic waste" was as important
as preventing physical waste.32 Military control was followed by statutes
24. STocKING, THE On. INDUSTRY AND THE ComPrrTIE SysTE (1925) Is-1;
WATKINS, OIL: STABILIZATION OR CONSERVATION? (1937) 22.
25. KE-MNiTZER, REBIRTH OF 'MONOPOLY (1938) 51; WATKINS, OIL: STABIIZATIOn
OR CoN ERVATION? (1937) 43. Compare 1926 and 1938 oil inventory figures, 6 TNEC,
VERBATM RECORD OF PROCEEMINGS (1939) 89, with corresponding consumption figures,
id. at 53.
26. 6 TNEC, VERBATim RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (1939) 229.
27. See WATKINS, OIL STABILIZATION OR CONSERVATION? (1937) 43, 45; Marshall
and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 702, 708, n. 19.
28. 6 TNEC, VERBATIM RECORD or PROCEEDINGS (1939) 230; VATKINS, OIL: Sr-
BILIZATION OR CONSERVATION? (1937) 44, 251; Lesar, Public Control of the Oil Indus-
try (Unpublished thesis in Yale Law School Library, 1937) 31-38.
29. The question of the exhaustibility of our petroleum resources within an appre-
ciable time, fundamental to any evaluation of production control, remains unsettled.
Despite increasing production virtually every year since 1914, estimates of petroleum re-
serves are now higher than ever before. 6 TNEC, VEMB.ATnt REcorn oF PnocrmnIGs
(1939) 80. A restless technology has recovered an increased yield of gasoline from each
barrel of crude oil, plumbed strata once regarded as inaccessible and struck oil in areas
deemed sterile. Id. at 400-02, 597. Substitutes for petroleum are under developmenL
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H. M. 4547, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 99-100; see PrTEZGmL, HoT OL (1936)
19-26.
30. See 47 STAT. 260, 266 (1932); KEMNITZER, REBIRTH OF MONOPOLY (1938) 128,
134; PETTENGILL, HOT OIL (1936) 54. The tariff then imposed upon Venezuelan crude
oil has recently been halved. N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1939, p. 6, col. 1.
31. Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petrolemn Production: Two Years
of Proration (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 702, 716-26.
32. Id. at 711.
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prorating oil production among the oil wells of a state,3 3 although unitary
pool operation would have been more consistent with principles of real oil
conservation.3 4 At the other end of the industry, attempts were made at
"cooperative market stabilization." 35
"Cooperation" as a mask for self-interest attained full bloom with the
advent of NRA.3 6 Section 9(c) of the National Recovery Act assured federal
reinforcement of state proration statutes,37 while the Petroleum Code, which
was largely devised and administered by the controlling interests in the in-
dustry, set up mechanisms for limiting imports, curtailing withdrawals of
crude oil from storage, and fixing crude oil and gasoline prices.38 The market-
rigging activities in the instant Socony-Vacuurn case were the result of an
opportunistic seizure of a maladjustment in the Code's administration. The
distress position of the independent refiner which forced him to dump his
"surplus" on the spot market resulted from the pegging of crude oil from
44 cents to the inordinate price of $1 a barrel.3 9 When the price of gasoline
33. Id. at 728; Lesar, Public Control of the Oil Industry (Unpublished thesis in
Yale Law School Library, 1937) 38. State proration statutes are summarized in 1 SuM-
MERS, OIL AND GAS (1939) 218-273.
34. See MID-CONTINENT OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK ON UNITIZATION OF
OIL POOLS (1930) 52 et seq.; Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Pro-
duction (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 33, 59-63. The major companies have recently favored
unitization. 6 TNEC VERBATIM RECORD OF PROCErDINGS (1939) 245-47.
35. Lesar, Public Control of the Oil Industry (Unpublished thesis in Yale Law
School Library, 1937) 99-101; WATKINS, OIL: STABILIZATION OR CONSERVATION?
(1937) 45-46.
36. See 2 REP. NAT. RECOVERY REv. BOARD (1934) 48-55; WATKINS, OIL: STABILI-
ZATION OR CONSERVATION? (1937) 255; Hallgren, The NRA Oil Trust (1934) 138
THE NATIONT 271. Several writers have condemned NRA as a front for scarcity-monger-
ing by big business. See STOLBERG AND VINTON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TIlE
NEW DEAL (1935) 32, 34; HACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE NEW DEAL (1935) 111;
SOULE, THE COMING AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1934) 234, 260.
37. 48 STAT. 200 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 709(c) (1934). When this section was de-
clared unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power in Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), Congress replaced it at once with the Connally
"Hot Oil" Act which set up an administrative machinery for preventing interstate tranls-
portation of oil or gasoline produced in excess of state quotas, 49 STAT. 30 (1935), 15
U. S. C. § 715 (Supp. 1939). The Act's operation was continued in 1937 and again in
1939. 50 STAT. 257 (1937), 53 STAT. 927 (1939). Its enforcement has been aided by a
compact among the oil states, 49 STAT. 939 (1935); 6 TNEC, VERBATIM RECORD OF PRO-
CEEDINGS (1939) 67-68, 188-89; Ely, The Conservation of Oil (1938) 51 HARv. L. REV.
1209, 1215.
38. The Petroleum Code, Art. III, § 1 (limitation on imports) ; id. § 2 (withdraw-
als of crude subjected to approval of Planning and Coordination Committee); id. § 6
(price-fixing). These provisions, except for the extension of the price-fixing mechanism
to gasoline prices, were adopted from a code submitted by the major-dominated American
Petroleum Institute. WATKINS, OIL: STABILIZATION OR CONSERVATION? (1937) 60-61,
64. The Planning and Coordination Committee, which represented the industry in the
code's administration, was regarded by NRA's Review Board as an instrument of tic
major companies. 2 REP. NAT. RECOVERY REV. BOARD (1934) 50, 52.
39. Record, pp. 952-953, 958-959, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F.




naturally failed to rise in proportion, the refiner was squeezed between high
crude costs and low returns. The buying programs were sincerely addressed
toward helping the independent refiner out of the plight in which inept efforts
at market control had placed him 40 By continuing, however, to base contract
and posted prices upon the spot market price, although that price was now
artificially propped rather than competitive, the majors were able to capitalize
upon their good deed by an increase in gasoline prices throughout the entire
area.
Since the buying programs were in aid of a Government sponsored project
of "bailing out the independent refiner" and since defendants unquestionably
were lulled by the knowledge and consent of petroleum administration offi-
cials into disregard of the Recovery Act's requirement of written authoriza-
tion for exemption from the anti-trust laws,41 their contention that Govern-
ment approval of their activities should have been permitted to weigh in
their favor seems at first glance convincing. However, it seems undesirable
from a long range point of view to permit public officers, particularly minor
officials, to bind the Government to a certain course of conduct and to prevent
it from effectuating changes in policy which public interest may require.
Permitting officials to work an estoppel upon the Government would allow
an outgoing administration effectively to sabotage the work of its successors
or let a conciliatory Attorney General grant immunities to business which
might seriously embarrass later anti-trust enforcement. 40
2
The economic and legal defenses advanced by the majors and accepted
by the circuit court are noteworthy for their inapplicability to the realities
of the gasoline market. The court recites the tiny quantity of gasoline in-
volved as proof that competition was not impaired 43-an approach which
wholly fails to give effect to the market practices which made the area's
prices as dependent upon these few tank cars of gasoline as if the buying
programs had encompassed 99% of the oil states' production. Equally unreal
is the claim that elimination of part of the spot market restored competition
to normal-an argument premised upon an original and peculiarly static
view of competitive price as a fixed point on a scale. If supply rises above
this level it becomes "surplus" or a "competitive abuse." This view ignores
the dependence of supply upon price in failing to realize that the gasoline
in question was "surplus" only in that it could not be sold at the price
deemed proper. That the plan was voluntary rather than compulsory"a seems
quite immaterial in view of the small amount of "surplus" necessary to be
absorbed in order to gain the profits derivable from the buying programs.
40. The buying programs operated by the major companies followed upon a series
of unsuccessful Government attempts at raising refinery prices. Record an appeal, pp.
952-954, 1001-1007, 1048-1051, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 849
(C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
41. 48 STAT. 196 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 703 (1934).
42. See Katz, The Consent Decree i Antitrust Administration (1940) 53 H.%nv. L.
RE%. 415, 419-423.
43. See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 809, 827 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939).
44. See Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, C03 (1914).
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Had a few of the smaller majors refused to participate, the burden of
handling a few additional cars of gasoline would scarcely have weighed very
heavily upon the remaining companies. The attempt to distinguish Trenton
Potteries as forbidding price-fixing but permitting price-raising seems purely
logomachical, 45 particularly in view of the fact that any price activity under-
taken by a group as potent as the majors will necessarily "fix" prices. Nor
does the claim that defendants' conduct fall within the range of activities
permitted by Appalachian Coals appear valid. The coal combination was
always subject to effective competition and was specifically found to be unable
to control prices. Indeed, the Supreme Court reserved power to revoke its
blessing if the combination should in practice be revealed as monopolistic. 40
The companies participating in the instant programs, on the other hand, sup-
plied 85% of the area's gasoline, possessed complete power to control, and
actually did control all gasoline prices in the area.
47
As a conspiracy successfully directed at setting an artificial and non-
competitive price, the buying programs thus seem to fall directly within
the Sherman Act.48 However, it is scarcely to be expected that a reinstatement
of the verdict in the Socony Vacuum case will, standing alone, be a panacea
for the ills of oil. The piddling fines imposed are certainly small deterrent to
further monopolistic exploits. 40 Even if to the instant case are added the
other current attacks upon oil restraints - the companion suit directed against
uniform jobber contracts, an action to break up the Ethyl monopoly, and
an attack upon the marketing practices of west coast major companies50 -
the effectiveness of anti-trust action against the large oil companies must
necessarily be very limited. Where a score of companies thoroughly dominate
a large market, each company may affect the market to a considerable extent,
with the result that the market will follow the price policies of the largest
company. The effects of price leadership or mutual imitation of trade practices
45. See discussion in (1939) 39 COL. L. Rav. 1441, 1444.
46. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 373, 378 (1933).
47. Record on appeal, pp. 186, 188, 254, 291, 325, 328, 800, 1236-37, 1250, 1255-57;
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 105 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
48. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 397 (1927) ; Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 240 (1899) ; Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U. S. 375, 394, 396 (1905) ; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 541, 543
(1913).
49. The 12 corporate and 5 individual defendants who remained of the original 73
defendants were fined a total of $65,000. See Comment (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 284, 290;
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 733. The case appears to have had small effect upon market-
ing practices in the Standard of Indiana territory. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3,
Judiciary Committee, on H. R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 25.
50. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAwS (1938)
265 (13 major companies and 11 individuals pleaded nolo to charge of maintaining uni-
form jobber contracts and policies in regard to jobbers; fines and costs totalled $385,000) ;
United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., 27 F. Supp. 959 (S. D. N. Y. 1939), 48 YALE
L. J. 1089 (Ethyl Corp. enjoined from refusing to sell to those jobbers whose "business
ethics" or price policies were unsatisfactory to Ethyl's licensee oil companies); United
States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., N. Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1939, p. 15, col. 2 (oil com-
panies selling approximately 85% of gasoline in Pacific Coast territory indicted on
grounds of price-raising and restriction of production).
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are almost the same as those of an actual agreement between competitors,5 1
but there is no "contract, combination or conspiracy" to fall within the rubric
of the Sherman Act. The oil cases may have as their chief effect the realiza-
tion by the majors that, by acting separately but following each other's lead,
they may reap the advantages of combination without danger of prosecution.
The cases, however, seem to herald a more potent legislative attack upon
the major companies. Rumblings have already been heard in the form of
proposals for federal control of the petroleum industry, 2 for classing oil as
a public utility and for vertical disintegration of the major companies.,
3
Application of chain store taxes to service stations has forced the major
companies to make a nominal retreat from the retail field.* A bill recently
introduced in Congress would separate oil marketing from the other stages
of the industry. 5 A cry for pipe line divorcement has become increasingly
audible. 6 Inherent in the policy of disintegration are the enormous difficulties
which attend the. unscrambling of billion dollar eggs,57 but inasmuch as the
dominance of the majors is owing to their integrated positions, a breakup
along vertical lines seems the most effective route for a return to competitive
conditions.
A Supreme Court decision favorable to the Government in the present case
may well have importance beyond the limits of oil. In so far as the effective-
51. Price leadership is important as a fertile source of other restraints. The instant
conspiracy was successful only because it operated upon a market featured by price lead-
ership. Had retail and tank-wagon prices not adhered to the market leader's quotations,
they would not have risen in unison to the raised spot market level, and the market rig-
ging scheme would have been forced to give way before price competition.
52. See proposal of Secretary Ickes, N. Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1939, p. 9, col. 7; Hear-
ings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Forcign Commerce on
H. R. 441, 73d Cong., Recess (1934) 433-56.
53. 6 TNEC, VmAim- REcoRD OF PR0ocCmIIGS (1939) 261-64; Kms:aTm , RE-
B=RTH OF MoxopoLY (1933) 230.
54. See 6 TNEC, Vm.RATn REcoRD OF PRoCECDINGs (1939) 630-31, 647; Fox v.
Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 92, 97 (1935) ; Lesar, Public Control of the Oil
Industry (Unpublished thesis in Yale Law School Library, 1937) 132-36.
55. See Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, Judiciary Committee, on H. R. 2318,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1.
56. The National Recovery Act authorized the President to institute proceedings to
divorce pipe lines from holding companies whenever unfair practices or exorbitant rates
tended to create a monopoly. 48 STAT. 200 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §709(b) (1934). Pro-
ponents of divorcement base its validity on the analogous separation of the railroads from
their coal interests by the Hepburn Act, 34 STAT. 5S5 (1905), 49 U. S. C. § 1(8) (1934),
and the divorcement of the meat packers from their retail outlets. United States v. Svift
& Co., 276 U. S. 311, 328 (1928). See 6 TNEC, VrERn,Tr E rcoRD oF Pno E=CDGs
(1939) 128, 255-59, 262; Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, Judiciary Conmittee, on
H. R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 91-95; United States v. Columbia Gas & Elec-
tric Corp., THE FEDEnAL ANrausT LAws (1938) 260 (consent decree divesting com-
panies of their control of natural gas pipe line).
57. It is also feared that disintegration, by requiring each stage in the industry to
return a profit, may raise prices to consumers. 2 N. Y. LEGisLATuRE, REroT OF JOr.T
Cot smrrEu ox GAsourNE (Legis. Doc. No. 93, 1938) 15; Hearings before Subco.W.ttee
No. 3, Judiciary Committee, on H. R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 177.
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ness of the conspiracy depends upon the size of the majors rather than upon
the fact of combination, the case may be an opening gun in an attack upon
the statement in the Steel case that "the law does not make mere size an
offense."J'' In particular, it furnishes an opportunity for the court to state
that it will not brook extension of Appalachian Coals to nullify the anti-trust
laws whenever an industry chooses to stigmatize a market factor with an
epithet such as "competitive abuse" or to invoke the talisman of "coopera-
tion." A clear announcement that the Supreme Court will not be hood-
winked by "pious protestations and smug preambles . . . when men are
found busy with schemes to enrich themselves through circumventions"'
may well give pause to big business in many fields besides oil.
VALIDITY OF A LIEN CREATED BY SEGREGATION OF STOCKS
AND BONDS AS SECURITY FOR A LOAN*
IN New York the status of a lender for whom stocks and bonds are segre-
gated as collateral, when the instrument is not recorded under Section 230
of the state Lien Law, has been unsettled since the case of Sexton v. Kessler1
in 1911. At that time an unfiled mortgage of "goods and chattels" was void
by statute as against creditors, unless there was immediate delivery by the
mortgagor and a permanent change of possession.2 But since stocks and bonds
were categorized as choses in action rather than goods and chattels, this
delivery requirement did not apply. 4 If the contract of security were treated
as a pledge, although unfiled, it was still valid so long as delivery occurred
before a creditor attached his lien.5
In Sexton v. Kessler, a stockbroker-borrower, more than four months prior
to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, set aside stocks and bonds
in a marked envelope as collateral for the lender. Later, during the four
58. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 451 (1920).
59. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting in Maple Flooring Ass'n v. United States,
268 U. S. 563, 587 (.1925). See Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S.
600, 608 (1914); Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 205, 226.
*Matter of Wyser & Diner, Bankrupts, C. C. A. 2d, Dec. 18, 1939.
1. 225 U. S. 90 (1911), aff'g,'172 Fed. 535 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909).
2. CUMMING & GILBERT'S, CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK (1909) LIEN LAW
§ 230.
3. Driscoll v. West Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 59 N. Y. 96, 105 (1874) ; Holbrook
v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 57 N. Y. 616 (1874). But the changing status of stocks is
indicated by the fact that despite classification as choses in action title passed to an
unregistered transferee in each case.
4. Niles v. Mathusa, 162 N. Y. 546, 57 N. E. 184 (1900) (mortgage of choses
in action not subject to lien law) ; Central Trust Co. v. West India Imp. Co., 169 N. Y.
314, 62 N. E. 387 (1901) (stocks and bonds classed as choses in action).
5. Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18 (1873).
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month period, he delivered the securities to the lender. In a suit by the
broker's trustee in bankruptcy against the lender, the United States Supreme
Court held that the latter was entitled to the stocks and bonds. The Court
relied both on the pledge doctrine of late delivery, and on the treatment of
stocks and bonds as choses in action. Fulfillment of a security contract by
a delivery apparently voidable seemed contrary to the policy against secret
liens accepted by New York courts.0 Yet since the contract involved choses
in action, even New York law admitted of the result.7 Thereafter it was
uncertain whether a loan secured by designated stocks and bonds, accom-
panied by a late delivery, or none at all, gave the lender title as against a
creditor, a trustee or even a bona fide purchaser. 8
Legislative remedies have failed to remove this confusion. A clear rule
for ten day late delivery in pledge would seem to be afforded by the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act,9 but no court has yet considered it applicable.1 0 Under
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, a bona fide purchaser of mortgaged stocks
6. The doctrine of "relation back" permits what is normally a voidable surrender
of possession, on the fiction that it occurred at the time of the original agreement to
give security. Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1904); Humphrey v. Tatman,
198 U. S. 91, 95 (1904). Its application in Se.xton v. Kessler, 225 U. S. 90 (1911), made
a violent extension of Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18 (1873), on which the Supreme
Court based its late delivery argument; for that case was sent back for a new trial
to discover whether the clerk who gave physical possession to the lender, had authority
to turn over rightful possession. The implication is that late delivery must occur and
cannot be forced, so that no right to the pledged articles existed. "Relation bach" was
intended to "perfect" a right against third parties, but seems to have created it altogether.
Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U. S. 90, 98. See Note (1937) 37 COL L. REv. 619, 624, n. 17.
Cf. Glenn, The "Equitable Pledge," Creditors" Rights and the Chandler Act (1939) 25
V.. L. REv. 422, 425 et seq. The New York court's hostility to imperfect contracts of
security led to the requirement of promptness in recordation, by which it overthrew
otherwise valid chattel mortgages. Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32 N. E. 1073 (1893);
Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N. Y. 476, 39 N. E. 11 (1S94).
The relation back doctrine in Sexton v. Kcsslcr seems to be clearly overruled by
§ 60a of the amended Bankruptcy Act. 52 STAT. 870, 871, 11 U. S. C. § 96a (Supp. 1938).
McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Aumed the Bantruptcy Act (1937) 4 U. ov
CHL L. REv. 369, 393.
7. With neither filing nor delivery a mortgage of choses in action had been held
valid against an assignee for value without notice. Central Trust Co. Y. West India
Imp. Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 323, 324, 62 N. E. 387, 390 (1901).
S. Stone, The Equitable Mortgage in New York (1920) 20 Co. L Rav. 519, 530.
9. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 574, PERs. Prop. LA w §§ 50-58 (esp. §53(1)). Bacon,
A Trust Receipt Transaction: II (1936) 5 FOrDHAm.! L. RE%. 240, 268. To the late delivery
rule of Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18 (1873), this statute adds validity against attaching
creditors for the ten-day period. Since it makes no exceptions, it should include pledges
of stock and bonds, and to this extent would amend § 230 of the Lien Lawv which requires
delivery on the day of the loan.
10. The court in the instant case was content to point out that, if applicable, the
rule was consistent with their result. Matter of WVyser & Diner, C. C..- 2d, Dec. 1939,
note 7. Although not meant to change constructive delivery, the statute was intended
to create a certain rule for late delivery. HANpr0ooK, NATe CO.-F. Co0 ' ons O: U aro.-
STATE LAWS (1933) 250.
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would be protected against the secret liens of third parties, 1 but the main
preference problems remain, since creditors 12 and the trustee in bankruptcy l a
would still lose out to the mortgagee, despite the absence of delivery and
recordation. For the protection of creditors, an amendment to the New York
Lien Law required recordation or delivery of possession to validate certain
types of "mortgage or pledge of, or lien upon stocks and bonds."' 14 But this
Act still left a loophole through which a lender's lien on stock or bonds
might escape its requirements, because in effecting the purpose to exempt
contracts securing brokers' one-day loans from recordation, the language
chosen included loans for a longer period only by inference. By rejecting
the inference it would still be possible to create an unfiled lien upon unde-
livered stocks and bonds, good against an attaching creditor, 1 to secure
the ordinary loan of more than one day.
A recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
however, closes this last avenue of escape.' 6 A stockbroker-borrower set aside
securities in an envelope as collateral for a loan of one year, marked the
envelope with the lender's name and noted the transaction in the firm books.
Later the broker went bankrupt without having surrendered possession of
the stock, and the trustee in bankruptcy took possession. The lender claimed
the segregated securities, arguing the existence of either a valid pledge
without manual delivery, a mortgage of choses in action, or a valid declara-
tion of trust by the broker. The court, without placing the transaction in
any of these categories, held it void "by whatever name," for failure to comply
with Section 230 of the New York Lien Law. Under that statute "any lien
upon stocks and bonds" is now void against creditors unless there is delivery
of possession or recordation of the instrument. By this construction Sexton
v. Kessler is no longer authority for evading Section 230 of the Lien Law.
However, the statutory requirement for a "lien upon" stocks and bonds
is not, as in the chattel mortgage provisions, an immediate and continued
11. N. Y. Laws 1913, c. 600, PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 162-185. Hale v. West Porto Rico
Sugar Co., 200 App. Div. 577, 193 N. Y. Supp. 555 (1st Dep't 1922).
12. Central Trust Co. v. West India Imp. Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 323, 324, 62 N. E. 387,
390 (1901). McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 371, 372.
13. The trustee shared the fate of an attaching creditor. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11
U. S. C. § 75a(2) (1927). By § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act as amended in 1938, the
trustee retains the rights of an attaching creditor. 52 STAT. 870-871, 11 U. S. C. § 110c
(Supp. 1938). He has the further power by § 60a to void any transfer which is not so
perfected prior to the petition that a bona fide purchaser may not thereafter get rights
against the transferee. The principal case began before the 1938 Amendment became
operative, and hence it was not applied. For the relation of § 60a to § 60e, see note 22
infra. Citations to the Bankruptcy Act hereafter will refer to the Act as amended in
1938 and will be by section number only.
14. N. Y. Laws 1916, c. 348, LIEN LAW § 230.
15. The district court in the principal case adopted this view, relying on Sexton to.
Kessler. Matter of Wyser & Diner, S. D. N. Y., March 31, 1939. Cf. Stone, mipra note 8,
at 531, 534. Mr. Justice Brandeis attempted to dispose of Sexton v. Kessler, in a footnote,
by adopting the interpretation of the instant case. See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353,
362, n. 15 (1924).
16. Matter of Wyser & Diner, C. C. A. 2d, Dec. 18, 1939.
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change of possession. Instead, it may be satisfied by recordation or "delivery."
The word "delivery," when used alone, would seem to require less than the
exacting change of possession required for chattel mortgages. Liberal con-
struction of the delivery concept might become a new mode of upholding
contracts of security otherwise invalid. It suggests the possibility that the
result of Sexton v. Kessler may again be reached, within the terms of the
statute.
This development might well be urged if Section 60e of the amended
Federal Bankruptcy Act should be construed to confer title on one who loans
money to a stockholder on the security of segregated stocks and bonds. By
this section preferential treatment is accorded to a "customer" class' 7 so
broadly defined that it would seem to include a lender secured in this manner.
Customers are "persons who have claims on account of securities received,
acquired or held by the stockbroker," not merely for the purchase or sale
of stocks, but also by reason of "loans of securities" to the broker, or "for
safekeeping." A person for whom stock is segregated and marked as col-
lateral for a loan of money is nowhere excluded.18 He might be included
as a claimant "on account of securities . . . held . . . for safekeeping."
Inclusion would result in a status similar to that of purchasers, vendors and
lenders of stock. Such a parallel is consistent with the policy of this section,
that claimants for securities shall all be grouped as creditors, for whom a
new rule of priority is created.' 9
To certain customers of a stockbroker called "cash customers," Section
60e(5) gives a "specific title" to securities which are properly segregated,
if no payment is due on them.20 The stocks and bonds must be physically
set aside or registered in the customer's name four months before bankruptcy,
or while the broker is still solvent, and must renain so allocated.21 By this
provision the lender would achieve the result of a perfect pledge without
obtaining possession. This protection, comparable to that afforded a paid-up
purchaser or lender of stock, and superior to that of the margin purchaser,
would not be inequitable, by reason of the values each gave in exchange for
the securities received. The lender's rights exceed those of general creditors
who have no "claims on . . . securities." Subsequent purchasers or pledgees
17. Section 60e(1).
18. The one reference to pledge, in paragraph (3), merely disposes of excess allot-
ments to the lender. It applies equally well to excess segregations.
19. Mr. J. A. McLaughlin summed up § 60e in these words: 'We are trying to put
all these customers whose money has gone into the security account of the broker in one
boat and do away with the present situation . . ." Hearings before Committee on the
Judiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 127. Paragraphs (2) and (5) of
§ 60e refer to claimants for the customers' fund as a "single and separate class of
creditors." See HANNA AND McLAUGHLzN, TnE BANnnurmc Acr oF 1893 AS A-= D
(1939) 61.
20. The Securities and Exchange Commission has suggested that it might be desir-
able to enlarge the cash customer class. SEC Release No. 2372, Jan. 10, 1940, at 2.
See Gilchrist, Stockbrokirs' Bankruptcies: Problems Created by the Chan:dler Act (1939)
24 MINN. L. REv. 52, 62 et seq.
21. Section 60e(4). In the noted ease certain of the securities remained segregated
until bankruptcy. Record on Appeal, pp. 7, 8.
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who obtain possession are not affected, because a customer's rights by segre-
gation are extinguished by removal of the securities.
2 2
This construction should not be avoided because of the possibility of fraud
usually urged against pledges where neither recordation nor delivery is
effected. 23 New York courts for about seventy years prior to the 1938 Amend-
ment to the Bankruptcy Act allowed a margin purchaser to recover his full
investment from the broker's trustee in bankruptcy, although there was neither
delivery, segregation nor marking.2 4 Under Section 60e, since segregation
of stock loaned to the broker is sufficient safeguard against fraud, a segregation
of stock as collateral for a loan of money cannot be attacked for that reason.
It is also unlikely that rights created under the Bankruptcy Act can be attacked
because of conflict with state lien law.
2 6
Since the status of a stockbroker's trustee in bankruptcy is at least equal
to that of the attaching creditor, recognition of a right against the trustee
in stockbrokers' bankruptcies might be persuasive in state courts that a
similar right should exist against attaching creditors.2 6 The requirement of
"delivery" in Section 230 of the New York Lien Law may then be recon-
sidered to determine whether segregation by the borrower is sufficient to
satisfy the statute.
Possession by the borrower when his creditor's attachment is levied does
not always invalidate a pledge. He may be holding in behalf of the lender.
as in cases where delivery in pledge occurred and the articles were returned
to the borrower in bailment.2 7 Bulky articles may be delivered constructively
22. Section 60e (4). Note that § 60e confers a title where segregation lasts until
bankruptcy. Manual delivery to a third party cannot then occur, and without it the
borrower is unable to effect a bona fide purchase. N. Y. PE.RS. PROP. LAW § 162. Thus
§ 60e does not conflict with § 60a which only concerns transfers after which a bona fide
purchaser could obtain rights superior to the transferee. Segregation serves the function
of delivery in pledge.
23. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) § 346.
24. Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869). See Sexton v, Kessler, 225 U. S. 90,
97, 98 (1911). There need only be sufficient shares of the kind ordered. Gilchrist, supra
note 20, at 55.
25. Congress' power to make uniform laws in bankruptcy by U. S. CoNsT. ART. III,
§ 8 is probably not limited to fixing the trustee's status. Hearings before Committee otn the
Judiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 209. See Shulman, The Demise
of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1350; Skilton v. Coddington, 185 N. Y.
80, 88, 77 N. E. 790, 791 (1906). Cf. Gilchrist, supra note 20, at 64.
26. By § 70c the trustee has the rights of an attaching creditor. The contention that
§ 60a confers on the trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser, McLaughlin, loc. cit.
supra note 6; Glenn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 447 has more recently been disputed. Glenn,
The Chandler Act and the Trustee as a Bona Fide Purchaser (1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 885.
27. Hickok v. Cowperthwait, 210 N. Y. 137, 103 N. E. 1111 (1913); Parshall v.
Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18 (1873) (alternative holding); See McCoy v. American Express
Co., 253 N. Y. 477, 171 N. E. 749 (1930), citing Bank v. Poynter [1895] A. C. 56, and Re
Allester [1922] 2 Ch. 211 (both cases permitting return to debtor for sale in behalf of
lender). Conceivably, this rationale fits the instant case; but tfie record does not state
whether or not the lender ever had manual possession of the securities and then returned
them. Matter of Wyser & Diner, Record on Appeal pp. 12, 15. Professor Glenn makes
this explanation of the holding in Sexton v. Kessler. Glenn, supra note 6, at 448, 449.
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in pledge, merely by identification and marking with the pledgee's name.2s
Delivery by a borrower to his own agent may satisfy as a delivery to the
lender, if the agent agrees to hold for the lender. -3 The essence of these
cases appears to be that in the absence of manual delivery to the lender, and
continued possession by him, security may be given by the mere separation of
the articles of pledge from the borrower's property, which he or an agent
then hold in the lender's behalf. Yet no New York precedent in the pledge
field has gone so far as to validate a contract of security against creditors,
when the articles were convenient of manual delivery, and remained merely
segregated in the debtor's possession.30
Related cases, however, have made the separation and marking of a fund
for a particular purpose sufficient for transfer.0 ' Wiere a deposit of money
is set apart to pay dividends, either placed in a bank under the debtor's
name,3 2 or held by the debtor himself,33 the fund is considered devoted to
that purpose and may be claimed by designated transferees as against credi-
tors 3 4 If the fund is set aside for interest payments, and further is credited
to the transferees, it follows the same rule although never out of the debtor's
possession.35 The outline of this transaction would fit the security contract
of the instant case which segregates stocks and bonds, marks them as the
lender's and notes the interest created thereby on the company's books. °
28. See McCoy v. American Express Co., 253 N. Y. 477, 483, 171 N. E. 749, 751
(1930) ; Babcock v. Edson, 82 Misc. 144, 143 N. Y. Supp. 399 (County Ct. 1913).
29. See McCoy v. American Express Co., 253 N. Y. 477, 483, 171 N. E. 749, 751
(1930), citing Dunn v. Train, 125 Fed. 221 (C. C. A. 1st, 1903) ; Philadelphia WVarehouse
Co. v. Winchester, 156 Fed. 600, 610 (C. C. D. Del. 1907) ; Bush v. E.,pert Storage C9.,
136 Fed. 918 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1904).
30. Claimant made this argument from Sexton -. Kessler. Brief for Appellee, pp.
4, 5, Matter of ,Vyser & Diner, C. C. A. 2d, Dec. 18, 1939. See Stone, loc. cit. supra
note 8. Matthewson v. Caldwell, 59 Kan. 126, 52 Pac. 104 (1S93). Neew York has
validated a pledge by assuming an "intended" delivery which did not occur. National Ban!:
of Deposit V,. Rogers, 166 N. Y. 3S0, 59 N. E. 9- (1901).
31. See People v. City Bank of Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32, 36 (18M).
32. Matter of LeBlanc, 14 Hun. 8, 9, aff'd, 75 N. Y. 593 (1878). See In re Inter-
borough Consol. Corp., 288 Fed. 334 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
33. LeRoy v. Globe Ins. Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 657 (N. Y. 1836).
34. If segregation is treated as a "delivery" in pledge the security is valid against
any creditor. RESTATEm-mT, SEcomr (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1938) §35(b), (c). In
chattel mortgage cases, the difference between simple and attaching creditor has been
one of procedure rather than substantive right. Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424 (1878) ;
Skilton v. Coddington, 185 N. Y. 80, 87, 77 N. E. 790, 791 (1906). For pledge the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act perpetuates the distinction for cases where no delivery has
occurred. Conditional sales have been accorded a similar distinction under N. Y. Prs.
PRoP. LAw § 65. in re Pellegrini, 248 App. Div. 526, 290 N. Y. Supp. 774 (2d Dep't
1936).
35. Van Dyck v. McQuade, 86 N. Y. 38, 52 (1881). The court relieves a ban:
trustee of the duty to contribute, partly because an interest declaration is a complete
transfer as soon as it is credited to the depositors; later acquiescence is inoperative. The
court indicates at page 52 that this transfer is good against creditors.
36. The fact that substitution occurred should not defeat the contract of security.
Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869); Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214 (1QS3);
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The result would not affect the superior title of subsequent purchasers and
pledgees for value.37 As to simple creditors, the delivery function is served
in that the borrower's books reveal the change in interest to third parties who
make inquiry. The device might be urged because of the convenience to both
parties in keeping the pledged stocks available for sale. 8
Thus although the court in the instant case seems sound in its holding
that the creation as against creditors of "any lien upon stocks and bonds"
is to be determined under Section 230 of the Lien Law, its result may well
be reversed under Section 60e of the Bankruptcy Act, or by extensions of
the "delivery" concept of the New York Lien Law.30
Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U. S. 90 (1911). Cf. Skilton v. Coddington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E.
790 (1906). Conversion by the broker does not destroy the security, even to the securities
removed, Lee v. State Bank Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) ; National
Surety Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 237 App. Div. 485, 261 N. Y. Supp. 605 (1st Dep't
1933), much less those remaining segregated.
37. N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAw § 165.
38. The lender in the noted case departed for the Orient immediately after the contract
of security was made, so that bailment in touch with the market was necessary. Where
the lender is not a financial expert, bailment of his stocks would be similarly practical.
See Glenn, supra note 6, at 449.
39. The court suggested a construction of § 230 of the Lien Law which precludes
this development; "delivery" being construed to mean the same immediate and permanent
change of possession required earlier in the statute for chattel mortgages. Though that
course involves a new strictness in the treatment of stock and bond contracts, it would
be in harmony with the policy against "secret liens." Irving Trust Co. v. Lindner, 264
N. Y. 165, 175, 190 N. E. 332, 335 (1934) ; Clark v. Flynn, 120 Misc. 474, 480, 199 N. Y.
Supp. 583, 587 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 891.
